THE  CAPITAL ASSET  CONCEPT: A CRITIQUE OF CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION: I by MILLER, PETER
THE "CAPITAL ASSET" CONCEPT:
A CRITIQUE OF CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION: I*
PETER MILLER"
THE favorable treatment presently accorded to capital gains is the
major exception to the principle of graduated I federal income tax
rates. Only half of any profit realized upon the "sale or exchange" 2
of a "capital asset" 3 held for longer than six months is included in the
seller's taxable income. 4 Furthermore, this half may not be taxed at a
rate in excess of 50%.5 The combined effect of these two provisions is
to permit the taxpayer 6 to pay no more than a maximum tax of 25%
on his "long-term capital gains," 7 notwithstanding the fact that
the tax on his "ordinary income" is calculated at progressive rates
rising to 82%. 8
*Part II of this article, consisting of Sections VI and VII, will appear in the next
issue of the JouAL.
t Member of the New York Bar.
1. DALTON, PRI cIPLEs or PUBLIC FINANCE C. IX (9th ed. 1936) ; Grovn, F,:xx:c-
ING GOVERNmSENT, 44-9 (1939); SELIGM1AN, PoG .SsXVn TAxATIoN It Tnmox AND
PRACrlCE, esp. 190-200 (1894) ; Blough, Ability to Pay Reexamined, 33 Proc. oF NAT.
TAx Ass'i 368 (1940); Buehler, Ability-to-Pay, 1 TAx L. r-% 243 (1946); Fagan
Recent and Contemporary Theories of Progressive Taxation, 46 J. or PoL. Eco,. 457
(1938) ; Kendrick, The Ability-to-Pqy Theory of Taxation, 29 AMs. EcoN. R=v. 92
(1939) ; Preinreich, The Theory of Progressive Taxation, 25 TAxEs 742 (1947).
But see LUTZ, GUImEPOSTS To A FREE EcoxNOY c. 9 (1945); Allen, Ability-to-Pay
Taxation Not Compatible witJI Private Property, 168 CoimmrRmCL AND FnIANCIAL
CHRONICLE 204 (1948); 'Magill, Report of he Special Tax Study Committee to the Com-
inittee on Ways and Means, reprinted in 25 TAXES 1029 (1947), wherein the prcsent law
was characterized as "a tax system which, instead of rewarding people in proportion to
how much they strive and accomplish, punishes them with a graduated penalty that in-
creases with their success." Id. at 1034.
2. Exchanges are included within the meaning of the term "sale" as used in Sec-
tions I through IV infra. The significance of the phrase "sale or exchange" is considered
briefly in Section V infra.
3. INT. REv. CoDE§117(a) (1).
4. INT. REv. CoDE§ 117(b).
5. IxT.REv.CoDE§117(c) (2).
6. Although the 25% rate is applicable to corporations under INT. RE%. CoDz
§117(c) (1), the treatment of corporate gains differs in certain respects from that of
gains realized by individuals. See HAMEmL et a[., Fomnts or Busiriss O GAZ=IATION
AND TH FEm .AL TAX LAws 31-2 (1949) (pamphlet in the Practising Law Institute
series on Current Problems in Federal Taxation); foroNm" & MfosER CAPITAL GA.us
AND LossEs 47-8 (1948) (pamphlet in the Practising Law Institute series on Funda-
mentals of Federal Taxation).
7. IxT. REV. CoDa § 117(a) (4).
8. The 82% figure is derived by adding the 3% normal tax [Izxr. REv. CoDZ § 11]
to the 88% surtax on net income in excess of $200,000 [INT. REv. ConE § 12(b)] and
reducing the resultant tax by 9.75% [INT. REv. CoDn §12(c)(1)]. However, "in no
event' may income tax liability exceed 77% of net income [INT. REv. CoDs § 12(c) (2)].
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Assuming that the federal income tax should treat like transactions
alike, the special treatment accorded capital gains can be justified
only if the transactions giving rise to such gains have characteristics
which set them apart from transactions resulting in ordinary income.
Whether these special characteristics actually exist has long been a
focal point for discussion. It is the purpose of this inquiry to recon-
sider this issue and to attempt to answer the question which underlies
all serious inquiry into capital gains taxation-Is the public interest
better served by such special treatment than by the taxation of capital
gains at the graduated rates applicable to income received in other
forms? This requires an examination, not only of the theoretical jus-
tification of the capital gain provisions, but also of their practical
operation.
Essential to an understanding of capital gains taxation is a famil-
iarity with the several categories of transactions that qualify for cap-
ital gains treatment. Sections I through V are devoted to a description
and critical appraisal of the principles, both legislative and judicial,
which determine whether profit or loss is to be classified as ordinary or
capital gain or loss. More specifically, Section I deals with the six-
month "holding period" criterion, Sections II, III and IV with the
"capital asset" criterion, and Section V with the "sale or exchange"
criterion. The discussion of these legal criteria is concerned primarily
with the degree of precision with which they attain their several ob-
jectives. These objectives are in turn scrutinized in Section VI which
considers the various ethical and economic arguments advanced in
support of special treatment of capital gains. Section VII sets forth
the author's recommendations.
I. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN INVESTMENT AND SPECULATION-HOW
THE MINIMUMI HOLDING PERIOD REQUIREMENT WORKS
The rather curious statutory prerequisites to capital gains treatment
are attributable chiefly to Congress' attempt to tax gains realized
upon the sale of "investments" more leniently than income from other
sources. The statute seeks to distinguish "investment" from the other
types of profit-making activity-and especially from "speculation" I
and "business" which also involve sales of property-primarily by
means of two requirements. To differentiate between "investment"
and "speculation," the statute provides that favorable treatment is to
be accorded to profit realized upon the sale of only such assets as were
9. It must be kept in mind that the statute does not speak of "investment" or "specu-
lation," although the courts often do. These terms are employed here only for the
purpose of separating one group of transactions ("speculation") from the many others
comprehended within what the statute calls "a sale or exchange of capital assets." The
remainder of this class, as will be seen, has a far wider sweep than the usual connotations
of the word "investment."
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owned by the taxpayer for more than six months preceding sale.' To
separate "investment" from "business," the statute provides that
special treatment is not to be given to profit realized upon the sale of
various kinds of business assets, particularly "property held by the
taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his
trade or business" (the "trade or business clause")."1 It is the purpose
of Section I to appraise the efficiency of the first of these two require-
ments.
As has been indicated, the role of the six-month holding period re-
quirement is to limit the effect of the capital gains provisions to profits
realized upon the sale of investment property, so that the profits of
speculation are subject to the surtax rates applicable to ordinary in-
come.' 2 Unless more than six months elapses between the acquisition
of an asset and its sale, the transaction is conclusively presumed not
to constitute the sale of an investment. 3 Gain realized upon the sale
of property held for less than this period is thus taxed as ordinary
income, regardless of whether the transaction is classified as specula-
tion or business. Therefore it is only in rather special situations 14 that
the characterization of the transaction becomes significant prior to the
expiration of six months.
Since the six-month period is designed to separate the investor from
the speculator, it is helpful, in evaluating this requirement, to examine
briefly some of the connotations of the terms "investment" and "spec-
ulation." According to popular usage, an owner of securities is not
considered a "speculator" merely because he cashes in on appreciation
in value by sale. 15 Nor is he classified as an "investor" solely by reason
of the fact that he has received a few dividend or interest payments
before sale. Although long-continued retention of a security is often
considered "investment," this may not be so if the corporation's ac-
tivities are "speculative," i.e., involve unusual risk.' G Such varied
usage indicates that the factual content of these terms is by no means
uniform.
10. INr. REv. CODE %" 117(b) and 117(c) (2).
11. INT. REV. CODE§ 117(a) (1).
12. Cf. note 24 infra.
13. The exceptions to this rule are analyzed in Diamond, Relationslsip of Basis to
Holding Period in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW Yoi Un.'ERsrr Frnxr A-nzuwa. Izusr-
ToTE ox FRDErAL T4XAToN 477 (1947).
14. For example, any amount of short-term capital gains may be viped out by
short-term capital losses of an equal amount or by long-term capital losses of tvice the
amount, whereas ordinary income may be reduced by capital losses only up to $1,00D per
year under Ixrr. REv. CODE § 117(d) (2).
15. "It should take no long argument to show that the isolated fact of the sale is not
a conclusive indication of the purpose for which the property was held. . . ." Resnicl,
Tax Problems in Liquidation Sales, 26 TAXES 1109, 1110 (1948).
16. Whether the vendor reinvests his sales profit or uses it for consumption purposes
may sometimes affect the characterization of the transaction.
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Perhaps the most satisfactory single criterion is that suggested in the
Chinook Investment Co. decision:
"The 'in-and-out' market hanger-on who buys and sells through
brokers on margin is a typical example of the pure speculator in
stocks. . . On the other hand, an investor is ordinarily thought
to be a person who acquires property for the income it will yield
rather than for the profit he hopes to obtain on a resale." 17
When the distinction between investment and speculation is made to
depend upon the intention with which property is held 11-4.e., whether
for the enjoyment of a more or less regular periodic return or for the
enjoyment of a single resale profit 9-the category of "speculator"
includes both A, the full-time professional trader, and B, who makes an
isolated purchase in the hope of appreciation. Under this definition,
the class of "investors" includes both C, who holds gilt-edge securities
solely for their periodic yield, and D, who holds the common stock of
the small company through which he conducts his business. This
scheme of classification purports to characterize the transaction and
not the taxpayer; an individual or corporation may concurrently hold
one property for investment and another for speculation.
A. The Rationale of the Minimum Holding Period Requirement
The minimum holding period has not always been six months. It
was two years from 1922 20 to 1938, and eighteen months from 1938 21
to 1942, when the present six-month period was first enacted. The pre-
1942 holding periods apparently presumed that the primary justifica-
tion for special treatment of capital gains is to mitigate the unfairness
17. United States v. Chinook Investment Co., 136 F2d 984, 995 (9th Cir. 1943).
For various reasons that will appear subsequently, the concept of speculation is employed
principally in connection with transactions involving securities. It is nonetheless of great
importance, not only because 8576 of all capital gains reported arise out of sales of
securities, H.R. RE. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938), 1939-1 Cum. BULL. pt. 2,
p. 733, but also because of its influence upon the phrasing of the definition of capital essets.
18. The "trade or business" clause in INT. REv. COD § 117(a) (1) refers, not to the
purpose for which property was "acquired," but to that for which it was "held."
"[T]he intention of Congress ... was to include in the comprehensive word 'held,'
property which might or might not have been purchased primarily for the purpose of
resale." Richards v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 369, 373 (9th Cir. 1936).
19. Even this definition has its difficulties: the owner of property often remains in a
state of indecision as to whether to keep or sell, or he may hold an asset for one purpose
and then change his mind. It is also necessary to qualify the term "investment" so as to
include assets such as discount obligations which in effect accumulate interest till ma-
turity; otherwise the class of "speculators" would include school children paying $18.75
for United States Series E Bonds in the expectation of receiving $25 at the expiration of
ten years. Cf. Ixr. Ray. CoDE § 117(a) (1).
20. Revenue Act of 1921, § 206(a) (6), 42 STAT. 233 (1921).
21. Revenue Act of 1938, § 117(a) (4), 52 STAT. 501 (1938).
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of taxing in a single year, and at progressive rates, gains accruing over
several years.22 The holding period served to remove from the scope
of the capital gains provisions short-term gains which, under this the-
ory of capital gains taxation, were not deserving of lower rates. -3
The present six-month holding period is rationalized quite differently.
It is apparently predicated upon the hypothesis that gain upon sale
of an investment is entitled to special treatment, not necessarily be-
cause it has accrued over more than a single fiscal period, but be-
cause, by its very nature, it represents a much lesser ability to pay,
and accordingly deserves a lesser tax, than other types of income. No
such peculiar quality is attributed, however, to speculative profits;
they are thought to be of commoner clay deserving of no better treat-
ment than ordinary income. Since the trader characteristically plays
for relatively quick market fluctuations, six months serves to catch the
majority of these transactions.24 Such appear to be the premises of the
present statute.
22. This argument appears in the Report of the Committee on Ways and .Means to
the House of Representatives in support of the initial capital gains provisions enacted
in 1921. 1939-1 Cum. Buur. pt. 2, p. 176.
23. "Gains from sales of property held less than 1 year do not appear to ba entitled
to any preferential treatment for income-tax purposes over income realized in the form
of salaries, dividends, interest, and so forth." Statement of Roswell Magill, Under-
Secretary of the Treasury, Hearings before Connittee on IVa'ys and Means on Pro-
posed Revision of the Revente Laws, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 100, 106 (1933). This Niew
is shared by Harold M61. Groves and by Harry J. Rudick. C,PrTAL GAnzs T, xTio: 47,
65, 83 (Tax Institute Symposium, 1946). See also Statement of Acting Secretary of the
Treasury (Henry Morgenthau, Jr.) Regarding the Preliminary Report of Subcommittee
of Committee on Ways and Means. Hcarings before Committee on Ways and Means,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1933). The Treasury in 1942 favored eighteen months as the
minimum holding period; Statement of Randolph E. Paul, Tax Adviser to the Secretary
of the Treasury, Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means on H.R. 635S, 77th
Cong., Zd Sess. 1611, 1635 (1942).
Lower taxes on capital gains realized by investors have been urged, not alone be-
cause of the inequity caused by the pyramiding of accrued gains in the year of realiza-
tion, but because of undesirable repercussions on the national economy thought to
result from the deterrence of transfers of capital assets. It is to be noted that this line
of argument does not suggest how long a holding period should be required before the
profit upon the disposal of capital assets is treated apart from ordinary income from
other sources. Indeed the implementation of this criterion may be inconsistent with the
requirement of any holding period whatever. The Boland Bill, H.R. 6358, 77th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1942), provided for a flat rate of 10% on capital gains vithout regard to how
long assets were held. That this proposal has not yet been adopted is in large measure
due to the widely-held sentiment that its enactment would unjustifiably favor professional
speculators. Were this policy to be incorporated into the law, it would become necessary
to substitute for the minimum holding period requirement some other method of isolating
speculative from investment profits, if large-scale traders were not to benefit from the
low flat rate. One such device would be the deletion of the words "to customers" from
the "trade on business" clause found in Irr. REv. CODE § 117(a) (1).
24. "It is believed that a holding period of 6 months will be a sufficient deterrent to
1950]
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B. Inadequacies of the Miminum Holding Period Requirement
"[A] classification based solely upon the period of holding is not an
exact method for, segregating speculative from investment transac-
tions . . .1 5 A man may acquire and hold an asset with the intention
of keeping it indefinitely for its recurrent yield as an investment. If
less than six months later he sells it to diversify his holdings, any profit
on this non-speculative transaction is nonetheless subject to surtax as
"short-term capital gain." 25 Conversely, a speculative transaction
may not be consummated until six months have elapsed. Neverthe-
less the profit is taxable only up to the flat maximum rate. This latter
problem of long-term speculation arises in two distinct factual contexts.
One involves A, the professional speculator who engages in substantial
and recurrent trading.Y The other concerns B, the "amateur" who
intermittently plays the market in his spare time.2 The problem will
first be considered as it concerns B.
the speculator as contrasted with the legitimate investor." SEN. REP. No. 1631, 77th
Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1941). Cf. Schram, The Fallacy of Taxes on Capital Gains, 161
COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL CHRONIcLE 2606, 2633 (1945). See also statements by
Franklin Cole in CAPITAL GAINs TAXATION, 83, 87, 88 (Tax Institute Symposium,
1946). Mr. Cole argues: "A man taking a six-month risk, all things concerned [sic],
should be thrown into the investment category" because that period "coincides with the
risk taken in inventory, seasonal risk, in business enterprise." Id. at 51. However,
profits from the sale of inventory held for more than six months constitute ordinary
taxable income and are expressly excluded from the capital gain category by INT. REv.
CoDE § 117(a) (1). For still another defense of the six-month holding period, see the
remarks of Beardsley Ruml in CAPrrAL GAINs TAXATI O, supra, at 89.
The selection of six months as the dividing line appears to have been made in
reliance upon a supposed analogy to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 16(b), 48
STAT. 896 (1934), which authorizes the recovery on behalf of a corporation of profits
realized by corporate officers, directors, and other insiders from the sale of its stock less
than six months after purchase. "If six months is a measure of what constitutes a
speculative turn for the S.E.C., why is it not as good a measure for the Treasury"?
Supplementary Memorandum on the Capital Gains Tax Presented by Elisha M. Fried-
man, Hearings before Senate Finance Committee on H.R. 9682, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 254
(1938). Cf. testimony of Emil Schram, 1 Hearings before Senate Finance Committee
on HS. 7378, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1186, 1189 (1942).
25. Report of Subcommittee, Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means on
Proposed Tax Revision, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 9, 45 (1938).
26. INT. REv. CoDE §§ 117(a) (2) and (b).
27. Fuld v. Commissioner, 139 F.2d 465 (2d Cir. 1943), serves to illustrate the
activities of the professional speculator. "[Djuring 1933 Leonhard Fuld devoted an
average of eight hours per day to the study of new texts, reading services, charting
prices of securities, conferring with his broker, attending meetings of corporations in
which he owned securities, and consulting with corporate executives ...
"The main source of livelihood of [the petitioner] was from securities transac-
tions. [He] maintained no business offices [and] had no customers to whom [he] might
sell securities." Id. at 467.
28. Chemical Bank and Trust Co. v. United States, 21 F. Supp. 167 (Ct. Cl. 1937),
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x. The Long-term Profits of the "Amateur" Speculator
When B, the small-scale speculator, profitably sells an asset acquired
by him for speculative purposes more than six months previously, the
statute treats this as the sale of a "capital asset." Accordingly B is
taxed at the low flat rate enacted to benefit C, the investor. The ne-
cessities of administration explain this anomaly. B often differs from C
only in state of mind and not in easily recognizable overt behavior. If
"the devil himself knoweth not the thought of man," - the Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue could hardly be expected to.
Much criticism has been directed against the resultant paradox that
a man's "sideline" speculations are taxed more leniently than the in-
come from his principal occupation. As Roswell Magill remarked while
Under-Secretary of the Treasury, "It is hard to see why an individual
who makes $10,000 from a single sale of stock or other property, or
from several sales, has less capacity to pay income tax than a merchant
who makes a net profit of the same amount from a great number of
sales." 30 The full implications of the special treatment of non-recur-
rent transactions involving assets held for more than six months wvilU
become apparent from the later discussion, in Sections III and IV, of
sales of property other than securities.
2. The Long-term Profits of the Professional Speculator
Having considered why the long-term speculative gains of B, the
occasional market dabbler, are permitted to enjoy the capital gain
provisions, there remains to be answered a similar question concern-
ing the long-term gains of A, the professional speculator. Unlike the
random purchases and sales of B which outwardly may seem identical
with those of C, the investor, the activities of A may be identified by
their frequency, regularity, volume, small "spread," and so on. In
short, A is recognizable because he is engaged in trading on a scale
large enough to be characterized as a business. 31
Legislative History. Prior to 1934 A's profits were taxed in the same
manner as the profits of any other business-as ordinary income subject
involved a railroad executive affiliated with some sixty railroads for whom stock specu-
lation constituted a mere sideline activity. "The time consumed by him in the purchase
and sale of stocks composing his margin account... wias practically negligible, being
limited to not more than ten or fifteen minutes a day when in his New York office
compared to eight hours a day devoted by him to railroad matters." Id. at 172-3.
29. Y.B. 17 Edw. IV, £ 2 (1478).
30. Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means on Proposed Revision of the
Revenue Laws, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 106 (1939). Cf. view of Secretary llorgenthat,
Hearings, mpra note 23, at 4.
31. "A trader on an exchange, who makes a living in buying and selling securities
or commodities, may be said to carry on a 'business. .. :" Judge Learned Hand in
Bedell v. Commissioner, 30 F2d 622, 624 (2d Cir. 1929). Cf. Fuld v. Commissioner,
139 F.2d 465, 46S (2d Cir. 1943).
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to surtax. They were excluded from the operation of the capital gains
provisions by the following definition of capital assets:
" 'Capital assets' . . . does not include . . . property held by
the taxpayer primarily for sale in the course of his trade or bus-
iness." 32
Because of this phrase a speculator could not avail himself of the flat
capital gains rate merely because he had sold an asset held by him for
longer than the minimum holding period. He was also required to prove
that he was not a professional trader whose purchases and sales were
so recurrent and systematic as to constitute a "course of trade or bus-
iness."
In 1934 the latter requirement was abolished. 3  This change was not
motivated by legislative benevolence toward professional speculators.
On the contrary it was brought about by a congressional desire to
bring certain transactions within the capital gains provisions in order
that losses incurred in these transactions could not be deducted from
ordinary income. Congress was prompted to this action by the dis-
closure that several prominent financial leaders had paid no federal
income tax during 1930, 1931, and 1932 because their losses on sales
of securities offset their very substantial income from other sources. 4
This disclosure had resulted in a provision in the National Recovery
Act 35 restricting the deduction of losses upon sales of securities when
incurred by "traders or other taxpayers who buy and sell securities
for investment or speculation, whether or not on their own account,
and irrespective of whether such buying and selling constitutes the
carrying on of a trade or business." 36 In the Revenue Act of 1934
Congress sought to accomplish this same result 11 by amending the
definition of "capital assets" in the new Section 117 so as to exclude,
not all property held primarily for sale in the course of business, but
only such property as was held primarily for sale "to customers" in
the "ordinary" course of business. Since sale on a securities exchange
is not usually considered to be a sale "to customers," it was asserted
that this amendment made it "impossible to contend that a stock
speculator trading on his own account is not subject to the provisions
of Section 117." 38
32. Revenue Act of 1932, § 101 (c) (8), 47 STAT. 192 (1932).
33. Revenue Act of 1934, § 117(b), 48 STAT. 714 (1934). Cf. note 38 infra.
34. Latham, Taxation of Capital Gains, 23 CALIF. L. REv. 30, 34 n.13 (1935).
35. § 218(b), 48 STAT. 209 (1933), repealing § 23(r) (2) of the Revenue Act of
1932, 47 STAT. 183 (1932).
36. H.R. 708, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 13, referring to § 23 (r) of the Revenue Act of
1932; quoted in Francis Shelton Farr, 44 B.T.A. 683, 691 n.3 (1941).
37. Id. at 691.
38. Report of Conference Committee on H.R. 1385, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 22 quoted in
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The fact that a stock speculator would find it to his advantage to
make this contention only where he had realized a loss and not a gain
suggests that Congress was preoccupied with the immediate problem
of protecting the revenue during a depression when aggregate losses
exceeded gains. However, even if Congress had envisioned the con-
sequences of its amendment when a rise in market prices would make
possible a greater volume of gains, it would have had no reason to think
that the amendment unduly favored trading profits. This amendment
was part of a comprehensive revision of the method of taxing capital
gains and losses. Discarding the flat 121 % rate 31 on capital gains
which had prevailed since 1922, the 1934 Act subjected such gains to
full surtax rates but provided that only a part of the gain was to be
taken into account, depending on the length of time during which the
asset was held-the so-called "step-scale" method. -' Thus even if
classified as capital gain, 80% of the profit realized by a trader upon
sale of stock held by him for a little over one year would be subject to
surtax. By 1942, however, the "step-scale" system had been trans-
formed by a series of statutory amendments into the present 257r%-
effective-rate-after-sLx-months-scheme 11-- ith little mention in Con-
gress of the growing benefits which these changes afforded to persons
deriving their income from the business of trading in "capital assets." 42
Criticism. Probably no aspect of the present law on capital gains
has occasioned more vigorous criticism than the exemption from the
surtax of the long-term trading profits of the professional speculator.
Thus Professor Robert Murray Haig asks:
"But what is to be said for the fairness of an income tax that
levies its toll on the pay envelope of the wage-earner, the monthly
check of the salaried man, the annual profit of the merchant and
manufacturer, and the interest coupon of the widow, but that, at
the same time, exempts the winnings of the successful stock-gam-
bler and the unearned increments of the fortunate speculator in
vacant land?" 43
This sentiment should not be dismissed as merely reflecting a provincial
hostility to speculation as "gambling." While recognizing that "spec-
0. L. Burnett, 40 B.T.A. 605, 609 (1939), aff'd in part, 118 F2d 659 (5th Cir. 1941);
Gruver v. Commissioner, 142 F.2d 363, 368 (4th Cir. 1944).
39. Revenue Act of 1921, § 206(b), 42 STAT. 233 (1921).
40. The 1934 step-scale method is described in Hendricks, Federal Income Tax:
Capital Gains and Losses, 49 -Afv. L. REv. 262 (1935).
41. See INT. REv. CoDn §§ 117(b) and (c). Cf. Wells, Lcgislatire History of Treat-
inent of Capital Gains under the Federal Income Tax, 1913-194S, 2 NAT. T,X J. 12 (1949).
42. "An important fact to be kept in mind is that during a large part of the period
in which the 12y percent [capital gain] rate was in effect, the top surtax rate on ordi-
nary income was only 20 percent, whereas the present [1938] surtax rates reach 75
percent" Report of Subcommittee, supra note 25, at 37.
43. Taxation of Capital Gains, The Wall Street Journal, March 23, 1937, p. 4, col. 3.
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ulation . . . serves a useful economic function," Randolph Paul has
expressed a similar view on the part of the Treasury:
"Speculation is a way of securing a living in whole or in part.
This income should be treated exactly the same as the income of
a merchant, a lawyer, or a wage earner ...
The Treasury . . . would not discriminate against such
income; it would merely subject such income to taxation at the
same rates as apply to all other types of income." 11
It is noteworthy that in Great Britain, "a man who devoted the ma-
jority of his time to buying and selling securities on his own account
• . . [and who] would be held to be dealing in capital assets under the
definition in our Federal law . . . would be taxed on the gains from
such transactions" at progressive rates.4"
3. Circumvention of the Minimum Holding Period Requirement
As has already been indicated,4" the rationale of the present holding
period requirement is that it conforms to economic actualities in that
the great majority of speculative transactions are completed in less
than six months and that, as a practical matter, sale of an asset held
for longer than this period is likely to represent "a change of invest-
ments." This may well be true. It does not take into account, how-
ever, the fact that an arbitrary holding period necessarily invites the
timing of sales according to the vendor's tax advantage. This problem
is not peculiar to the six-month criterion.47 Thus it was reported in
1933 that "[t]axpayers take their losses within the 2-year period and
get full benefit therefrom,4" and delay taking gains until the 2-year pe-
riod has expired, thereby reducing their taxes." 11
44. Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 1611, 1634
(1942).
45. Parker, Capital Gains and Losses, 14 TAX MAG. 604, 605 (1936).
46. See text at note 24 supra.
47. "[T]he setting up of any time limit beyond which the status of a profit or los,
is substantially altered not only falls far short of its purpose even if it could be success-
fully carried out, but on the contrary may be avoided by taxpayers when it would oper-
ate to their disadvantage and made use of in other cases to gain advantages which it
was quite obviously never intended that it should bestow." Hogan, The Capital Gais
Tax, 9 TAX MAG. 165, 166 (1931).
48. Under present law this benefit is somewhat smaller because net capital losses
may reduce ordinary income only to the extent of $1,000 in the year when sustained, INT.
Rxv. Con § 117(d)(2), the balance being carried forward as an offset against capital
gains and $1,000 of ordinary income in each of the ensuing five years. INT. Rnv. CODE
§ 117(e) (1).
49. Report of Committee on Ways and Means rendered Feb. 12, 1934, 1939-1 CuM.
BuLL. pt. 2, p. 561. Cf. Hendricks, Capital Gains and Losses, 49 HARv. L. Rlv. 262,
286 (1935).
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Similar results may be achieved by more sophisticated devices. For
instance, what is factually a short-term profit may receive the benefits
of the rates intended for long-term investment by skillful manipula-
tion of a device known as the "put." The purchaser of a "put" obtains
the right to require the seller of the "put" to buy specified stock at a
set price within a stated period.
" 'Puts' can be used to insure realization of a gain within the six-
month period without having it classified as short term. For exam-
ple, if stock bought in January at $30 has risen to 40 in June, its
sale would result in short-term gain, fully taxable. If the taxpayer
purchased a 'put' in June . . . and waited until the end of the op-
tion period to 'put' the stock, his gain would be long term, only fifty
per cent taken into account. If by July the stock had risen to S50,
he would sell the stock (at a twenty-point long-term gain) and
would let his 'put' option lapse ... " 6
Other methods of avoiding the six-month holding period requirement
involve combinations of familiar devices such as "wash sales," "short
sales," and "sales against the box." For example, a taxpayer, having
acquired a given stock at less than the current price, may agree to sell
the stock at the current price, delivery being postponed until some
future date.-" He expects that a fall in price prior to delivery will en-
able him to perform his contract by delivery of the shares already
owned by him-thus insuring the realization of his long-term gain 52
and that he will then reacquire the stock at the anticipated low price.
53
If, however, the market has risen by the delivery date, the taxpayer
need not bewail his bargain. He will then sell his original shares in the
market, realizing an even larger long-term gain, and will pay little or
no tax on this gain because of a short-term loss resulting from the use
of new shares, purchased by him at the new high price, to fulfill his
commitment. By his choice of old stock or new stock for delivery
under his contract, the taxpayer may at his pleasure shift the trans-
action into either the long-term or the short-term category so as to
minimize his tax bill.
Thus, the methods employed by the law to segregate speculation
50. Mills, Tar Problemns in the Purchase and Sale of Securitioes, 25 TAXES 555, 561
(1947). "Since 'puts' . . . are options, losses from failure to exercise them are short-
term regardless of the time held [under IxT. REy. CoDE § 117(g) (2)]." Id. at 561.
51. A cash-basis seller's gain or loss is recognized for tax purposes, not when the
contract is made, but when the sale is "covered" by delivery of the stock.
52. Le., assuming that, by the time the sale is consummated the shares vill have
been held for more than six months.
53. As the "wash sale" results in a gain rather than a loss disallowed by IxT. REv.
CODE § 118(a), the basis of the new shares is their cost and is unaffected by Ixz-. Rav.
CoDE § 113(a) (10), even though the new shares are acquired less than 30 days before
or after the sale of the old shares.
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from investment are not only questionable in theory but are often
circumvented in practice. "
II. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SPECULATION AND BUSINESS-How
"SALE TO CUSTOMERS" HAS BEEN INTERPRETED
"The term 'capital assets' means property held by the taxpayer
(whether or not connected with his trade or business), but does not
include . . . property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to
customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business. .. ."
The statute attempts to distinguish not only between "speculation"
and "investment," but also between "speculation" and "business."
This is done by excluding from the definition of "capital assets"
property which is held for sale "to customers." As has already been
indicated,58 the speculator trading through a broker is not generally
considered to be selling "to customers." Accordingly, his long-term
profits are taxed at capital gains rates rather than as business profits
subject to surtax, even though he has sold property "held . . . prima-
rily for sale . . . in the ordinary course of his trade or business. . . ." 17
It has often been difficult to distinguish between a sale made by
a professional speculator and that made by a businessman out of his
stock-in-trade for the reason that they share an important common
factor; in both cases the property sold has, before its disposition, been
held primarily for the purpose of resale as part of a more or less system-
atic course of buying and selling. This factual similarity is so much
more conspicuous than the legal distinction (i.e., that a businessman is
one who sells "to customers" whereas a speculator does not) 11 that it
is not surprising to find much hair-splitting as to the meaning of these
magic words.
The many factors scrutinized in determining whether securities have
been sold "to customers" 11 are succinctly set forth in the case of
Achille 0. Van Suetendael6 ° Van Suetendael maintained an office in
54. See also Bachrach, Advantageous Tax Positions in Securities Transactions, 25
TAXEs 720 (1947) ; Hogan, The Capital Gains Tax, 9 TAX MAG. 165, 166 (1931) ; Stone,
How the Capital Gains Tax Affects Buying and Selling Securities, 26 TAXEs 1041 (1948).
55. INT. REv. CoDE § 117(a) (1).
56. See text at note 38 supra.
57. See note 31 supra.
58. This rather tenuous distinction is often overlooked. Cf. Beardsley Rural in
CAPrrAL GAINs TAXATION 88 (Tax Institute Symposium, 1946): "It seems to me . . .
that at Macy's when we buy some women's dresses to sell in six months or six weeks,
that is speculation, if we want to use that horrid term."
59. If the statutory syntax is scrutinized closely, it may be interpreted as saying that
the actual sale consummated by the taxpayer need not be to a "customer" so long as the
property was previously held for the purpose of sale "to customers."
60. 3 T.C.M. 987 (1944), aff'd, 152 F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 1945).
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Yonkers and had one employee. He had a teletype machine, four
telephones, and statistical financial publications in his office. He was
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
State of New York as a security dealer, was listed as a "dealer" in
certain publications, and advertised himself as willing to buy or sell
securities. To a small degree he had participated in selling groups for
the purpose of distributing new issues of securities. These are hardly
the indicia of a "speculator" but rather connote a "business" in secur-
ities. Nevertheless the Tax Court held that Van Suetendael might de-
duct his losses on sales of securities, not to their full amount as business
losses, but only to the extent permitted capital losses. In support of
its finding that the taxpayer, although perhaps a "dealer," 01 had not
held his securities "Primarily for sale to customers," the court empha-
sized that (1) his purchases were not at wholesale but "were in rela-
tively small quantities and were diversified"; 0 - (2) he was not a
middleman selling to a class of persons unlike the class from whom he
purchased,63 but rather resold most of the securities "to or through
the same brokers from whom they were bought"; 14 and (3) his inten-
tion was not to create a stock of securities to take care of future buying
orders in excess of selling orders 65 but to dispose of the securities "at
a profit on the same day in which he purchased them or a short time
thereafter." cl
61. "[W]hether he was engaged in business as a dealer in securities ... is not the
issue....
"[Tibere are many sales by so-called dealers in securities which do not come ithin
the exceptions set forth in the definition of capital assets." Achille 0. Van Suetendael,
3 T.C.M. 987, 992 (1944) ; cf. Shafer v. Helvering, 299 U.S. 171 (1936); Helvering v.
Vaughan, 85 F2d 497 (2d Cir. 1936), ccrt. denied, 299 U.S. 606 (1936) ; Francis Shelton
Farr, 44 B.T.A. 683, 690 (1941) ; I.T. 3891, 1943-1 Cum. Buu.. 69.
62. Achille 0. Van Suetendael, 3 T.C.M. 987, 993 (1944) : "We think it apparent
that, in describing the excepted class by reference to the term 'customers,' Congress was
characterizing not the vendee but the type of business." Francis Shelton Farr, 44 B.T.A.
683, 690 (1944).
63. Seeley v. Helvering, 77 F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1935).
64. Achille 0. Van Suetendael, 3 T.C.M. 987, 993 (1944). In Trading Associates
Corporation v. Magruder, 112 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1940), this same criterion was applied
in determihing that a corporation was not exempt under § 351(b) (1) (A) as a "regular
dealer in stock or securities" from the surtax imposed upon personal holding companies
by § 351 (a) of the Revenue Act of 1934, 48 STAT. 751 (1934); it employed no salesmen
and was not actually dealing with the general public in the purchase and sale of securities
but merely bought and sold stock for speculation on its own account through one
firm of brokers. Id. at 781. It has been suggested that one is not in the "business" of
"dealing" with "customers" as a securities "merchant" if he has no "regular clientele."
Sack, Profit and Loss from the Sale or Exchange of Securities, 1 TJxLns 152 156
(1940).
65. Schafer v. Helvering, 299 U.S. 171, 174 (1936).
66. Achille 0. Van Suetendael, 3 T.C.M. 987, 993 (1944). Some of the securities
purchased through the two brokerage houses were not delivered to petitioner but were
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The Van Suetendael and similar decisions 67 may well represent
Pyrrhic victories for the Commissioner. By narrowly construing the
category of persons in the securities business, they made it possible
for taxpayers such as Mr. Van Suetendael to pay no more than a 25%
tax upon the high volume of long-term profits which resulted from the
coming of World War Il and the attendant upswing in the stock
market.6 Thus have the courts intensified the artificial 60 distinction
made by Congress.
Although the criteria set forth in the Van Suetendael opinion are
typical of the decisions involving sales of securities, several securities
cases significantly fail to apply these criteria. 70 By broadening the
interpretation of "sale to customers," these cases afford a possible mode
of escape from the anomalous consequences of a statute which, by
singling out one particular type of business,71 implies that neither the
gains nor the losses to which it gives rise affect ability to pay taxes as
much as gains or losses of equal amount realized in any other line of
endeavor. There is, however, at least one outside limit to the process
of restricting the category of capital gains and losses by enlarging the
meaning of "property held primarily for sale to customers." Because
the words "to customers" were inserted in the statute to distinguish
professional traders in securities from dealers in securities,7 2 the courts
can not very well say that any purchaser of securities is a "customer" 71
and thus, by depriving that term of all effect, defeat the unmistakable
kept by the brokers. "In this respect, his operations were similar to a trader pur-
chasing securities on margin." Id. at 993.
67. Shafer v. Helvering, 299 U.S. 171 (1936); Trading Associates Corporation v.
Magruder, 112 F.2d 779 (4th Cir. 1940) ; Helvering v. Vaughan, 85 F.2d 497 (2d Cir.
1936), cert. denied, 299 U.S. 606 (1936) ; Seeley v. Helvering, 77 F.2d 323 (2d Cir. 1935);
Francis Shelton Farr, 44 B.T.A. 683 (1941).
68. "If the situation here had been the other way around, that is to say, if the
transaction had resulted in gains instead of losses, it would not be surprising to find the
Commissioner occupying the position now championed by the taxpayer and vice versa.
So things are apt to go in the domain of tax litigation." United States v. Chinook In-
vestment Co., 136 F.2d 984, 985 (9th Cir. 1943).
69. "[The difference between buying and selling as a business and doing so as an
investment avocation is rather artificial." GROVES, POSTWAR TAXATION AND ECONOmIC
PROGRESS 217 (1946). Cf. GROVES IN CAPITAL GAINS TAXATION 17 (Tax Institute Sym-
posium, 1946).
70. United States v. Chinook Investment Co., 136 F.2d 984 (9th Cir. 1943) ; Harry
Dunitz, 7 T.C. 672 (1946); cf., Gilbert v. Commissioner, 56 F.2d 361 (1st Cir. 1932),
reversing 21 B.T.A. 1245 (1931); Joe B. Fortson, 47 B.T.A. 158 (1942); -lercules
Motor Corp., 40 B.T.A. 999 (1939).
71. See note 31 supra.
72. See notes 37 and 38 supra.
73. Compare: "Where, as here, one is regularly engaged in the business of buying
and selling real estate, as was petitioner, any person who can be found to buy such
property is a customer, as that term is ordinarily understood ... " Charles H. Black,
Sr., 45 B.T.A. 204, 210 (1941).
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legislative intent. Congressional purpose, however, is no obstacle to
the employment of a broader interpretation of "sale to customers"
in connection with property other than securities.
"There has ...been no disposition in the cases to carry this dis-
tinction over to the real estate field and to create a class of real es-
tate 'trader' who is engaged in the business of buying and selling
real estate, but who is not a dealer because he does not sell 'to cus-
tomers in the ordinary course' of his business ... .The thought
underlying the real estate decisions may be that sales of real prop-
erty are, because of the uniqueness of each property, personalized
from the viewpoint of the buyer, thus constituting him a 'customer'
of the business. On the other hand, the trader who is engaged in the
business of selling securities over an exchange offers a fungible com-
modity to an anonymous group of bidders, so that the sale of a par-
ticular security by the trader to any particular buyer is imperson-
alized almost to the point of coincidence; the buyer would just as
readily have taken an identical security from any other seller, and
therefore cannot be said to be a 'customer' of the particular
trader." 74
It should be noted that this hypothesis is inconsistent with cases hold-
ing that the sale of a patent by an inventor is not "to customers"
even though the vendor has close personal contacts with the vendee
and the property sold is the most "non-fungible" imaginable.7 5 It is
in these cases-which concern not the business versus speculation
problem but the business versus investment problem-that one can
never tell when "sale to customers" will evoke in the judge's mind the
image of the neighborhood grocer and Mrs. Jones7 G with utterly fan-
tastic tax consequences. The ensuing sections will show that the
"customers" concept, enacted as a means of separating dealers from
professional speculators, operates in many other areas as a dangerous
roving element whose path is unpredictable and whose impact may
shatter equity.
III. Tmi DIsTINcTIoN BETWEEN Busn~mss AND ImNESTMrNT-HOw
TiEE "TRADE oR BusINEss" CLAusE APPLIES TO S.*La.s OF
PATENTS BY INVENTORS
Having indicated the principal criteria by which the tax law attempts
to distinguish between investment and speculation and between spec-
ulation and business, there remains the task of tracing the blurred and
convoluted line which has been drawn between business and invest-
ment, or, in terms of the statute, between those transactions which
74. Fink, "Dealing" in Real Estate, 2 TAX L. REv. 111, 114-115 (1946).
75. William M. Kelly, 6 T.CAM. 646 (1947) ; Lester T. Barlow, P-H 1943 TC MUr-
DEc. fJ 43,237. See discussion of patent cases in Section III infra.
76. "The analogy to groceries is particularly strong." Groves in CAPITAL GAn;S
TAxATIoN 17 (Tax Institute Symposium, 1946).
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give rise to ordinary income and fully deductible loss, and those--
other than long-term speculation-which give rise to capital gain and
loss. This boundary is largely spelled out of the "trade or business"
clause. Its contours are tortuous partly because this deceptively
simple clause is applied to diverse factual situations, partly because
it embodies 'not one but several overlapping criteria. In order to
elucidate the interaction of these two sets of factors, factual and legal,
the present Section endeavors to study the various criteria inherent in
the statute as they operate in a narrow field: the sale of patents by
inventors. By thus isolating the component elements of the "trade or
business" clause, the present Section serves as a convenient introduc-
tion to the following Section which examines the application of this
clause to a great variety of factual situations for the purpose of de-
termining how well the statutory scheme does its job of segregating
investment from business.
A. The Requirement of Repeated Transactions
Under what circumstances will the sale 11 of a patented invention
by its inventor generate capital gain because it is not a sale of "prop-
erty held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the or-
dinary course of his trade or business"? Most of the judicial opinions
which address themselves to this question purport to answer it by
comparing the facts of the case at bar with those found in the case of
Harold T. Avery.7 Avertr, the chief engineer of a manufacturing corpo-
ration, was required by contract to assign to his employer any inventions
he might make while directing its experimental work, except for about
a dozen inventions conceived before his employment commenced. In
1935 Avery sold to the corporation one of the dozen inventions. Before
this sale, he had sold two patents and licensed two others out of the
dozen. The Board of Tax Appeals held that the proceeds of sale in
1935 were not capital gain.
"[Pletitioner was engaged outside of his regular hours of employ-
ment in the business of inventing and selling and licensing of pat-
ents obtained by him. . . . [T]he inventions and patents which
he was not contractually obligated to transfer to his employer con-
stituted property held by him 'primarily for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of trade or business.' " 79
77. See note 2 supra. Concerning the distinction between sales and licensing agree-
ments, see Edward C. Meyers, 6 T.C. 258 (1946). But see Mii. 6490, issued March 20,
1950, 5 CCH 1950 FED. TAx REP. 6095 (T.C. 1950).
78. 47 B.T.A. 538 (1942).
79. Id. at 541. In Goldsmith v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1944), Judge
Learned Hand cited the Avery case with approval and said: "I can find nothing in the
history of the legislation which intimates the contrary of this construction."
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The Avery case is to be contrasted with the case of John XV. Hogg," a
clerk employed in a non-inventive capacity in an engineering depart-
ment. Mr. Hogg invented several devices by working about four hours
each week at night in his basement. Over twenty years he took out
four patents. In 1937 he licensed one of them to an airplane manu-
facturer. In 1940 he sold this- patent to the licensee. The Tax Court
decided that Mr. Hogg had realized only capital gain because an iso-
lated sale did not constitute a "course of business." Si
In common parlance, Mr. Hogg could hardly be said to have been
"in business," since that term connotes repeated transactions, and the
entire extent of his dealings was to license a single patent and then sell
it. Yet is this result really as self-evident as it appears at first blush?
After all, if Mr. Hogg was not in business, what was he doing when
he was tinkering down in the basement in his spare time? If his activity
were only a hobby, it is fair to ask, as did the Board in the Avery case,
why did he trouble himself to patent his inventions? 3 12 Suppose that
Mr. Hogg subsequently found purchasers for his three other patents;
presumably the repetition of the sale would cause a finding that he had
gone into "business" 13 and therefore that his profits were no longer
taxable merely as capital gain. Yet is it not strange that one of the
sales, identical with the others except that it happened first, should
receive a different tax treatment? This anomaly springs from the con-
ception of "business" as a series of recurrent dealings.3 I But why should
"business" be defined in this way? There is no reason to suppose that
Hogg's first sale gave rise to a lesser ability to pay than did Avery's
third. Whatever may be the validity of discriminating in favor of gain
arising upon a change in the form of investments,35 the invention sold
by Hogg hardly presents a very close analogy to the corporate stock or
real estate sold by the typical investor.
Assuming that Mr. Hogg and Mr. Avery are so similarly circum-
stanced that they should be taxed similarly, the question arises whether
parity of treatment could be established under any reasonable inter-
pretation of the present statute. Section 117(a) contains no definition
80. John V. Hogg, P-H 1944 TC IMi. DEC f 44,066 (1944).
81. The Avery case was distinguished on the ground that Avery %%-as a "professional
inventor" whereas Hogg was only a clerk Since in both cases the inventions were not
made in the course of the taxpayer's employment, the nature of that employment would
seem to have little relevance to the characterization of his outside activities.
82. Harold T. Avery, 47 B.T.A. 53S, 541 (1942).
83. Avery was held to be "in business" upon malng his third sale.
84. This conception furnished the theoretical basis of the much publicized ruling of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue that, as an "amateur" writer, General Dwight D. Eisen-
hower realized long-term capital gain rather than ordinary income upon the sale of the
copyright to his memoirs. Fulda, Copyright Assignments and the Capital Gains Tax, 58
Yi.¥s L.J. 245 n.1 (1949).
85. See discussion in Section VI infra.
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of the phrase "trade or business." 86 In passing upon the validity of the
Federal Corporate Excise Tax of 1909 in Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.," the
Supreme Court defined this phrase as "that which occupies the time,
attention and labor of men for the purpose of a livelihood or profit."
"'Business' is a very comprehensive term and embraces everything
about which a person can be employed." 85 This characterization con-
tains no suggestion that profits are not business profits if they are not
recurrent. However, in Higgins v. Commissioner,9 construing the
statutory provision permitting the deduction of ordinary and necessary
expenses incurred in the carrying on of a "trade or business""0 the same
Court considered its previous definition of the phrase inappropriate. 1
In United States v. Wooten, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
held that the Higgins interpretation of "trade or business" in connec-
tion with the expense deduction was to be applied to the same phrase
when used in the exclusionary clause of the definition of capital assets.2
It would appear, therefore, that the broad definition of "trade or bus-
iness" contained in Flint v. Stone Tracy is not readily applied in the
interpretation of Section 117.13
The opinion of the Board of Tax appeals in the case of Samuel
Diescher 14 is typical of those in which "trade or business" is construed
to mean recurrent transactions. Mr. Diescher was unquestionably
in business as a member of a partnership of consulting engineers en-
gaged in the inventing, patenting, and licensing of various processes
and devices. The partnership realized a recognized 11 gain of some
86. Nor is the phrase defined as used in other sections of the Code, e.g., § 23 (k) (4)
on bad debts and § 122(d) (5) on net operating loss deductions. See Friedman, Bad
Debts: Business or Non-Business? 5 TAx L. Rav. 412 (1950).
87. 220 U.S. 107 (1911).
88. Id. at 171.
89. 312 U.S. 212 (1941).
90. Revenue Act of 1932, § 23(a), 47 STAT. 179 (1932).
91. "The immediate issue [in the Flint case] was whether corporations engaged prin-
cipally in the holding and management of real estate were subject to the [Corporation Tax
law which levies a tax on corporations engaged in business]. A definition given for such
an issue is not controlling in this dissimilar inquiry." Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S.
212, 217 (1941).
92. United States v. Wooten, 132 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1942) : "While the wording of
the sections [23(e) (1) and (2) and 117 (a) (1) (b) and (d) of the Revenue Act of 19321
with respect to engaging in and carrying on a business is slightly different [from that of
23(a) of the same Revenue Act construed in Higgins v. Commissioner], their meaning is
the same, and what is said in Higgins v. Commissioner, defining 'carrying on a business'
is controlling here." Id. at 402.
93. The Flint v. Stone Tracy definition of "trade or business" was, however, quoted
with approval in Fackler v. Commission, 133 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1943) holding that rented
real estate was "used in a trade or business" rather than a capital asset. See also dis-
cussion of Goldsmith v. Commissioner, notes 101 and 102 infra.
94. 36 B.T.A. 732 (1937), aff'd, 110 F,2d 90 (3d Cir. 1940).
95. The transaction did not meet the requirements for non-recognition imposed by
IxT. REv. CoDE §§ 112(b) (5) and 112(c) (1).
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$250,000 upon the assignment of certain patents to a newly organized
corporation. In holding that Mr. Diescher's share of this sum was tax-
able as capital gain, the Board of Tax Appeals remarked: "It is evident
that the patents and inventions here in dispute did not constitute stock
in trade, held for sale by the partnership in the course of its business." 1
This reference to stock in trade suggests that the Board interpreted
the clause found in the 1932 statute, "property held primarily for sale
in the course of the trade or business of the taxpayer," to mean pre-
cisely the same as, and no more than, the two preceding clauses-
excluding inventory and stock in trade from the capital asset category 01
-both of which connote repeated sales.
In Gilbert v. Commissioner,9 decided five years before the Diescher
case, this interpretation had been rejected by the Circuit Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit:
"The difficulty with this view is that it gives no effect whatever to
the provision under discussion. It is a well-settled rule of con-
struction that a statute should, if possible, be so construed as to
give meaning to all parts of it. Stock in trade and inventory prop-
erty having been covered by the first two classifications, the final
provision was evidently intended to cover something else. It in-
cluded in our opinion all property which was owned by the tax-
payer in connection with his business and held primarily for sale,
but which was not stock in trade or part of the inventory. This
was the understanding of the matter by the Ways and Means Com-
mittee as appears by its report to the House of Representatives on
the 1924 Act when clause (8) received its present form. '(2) The
last part of the definition of capital assets is changed to remove any
doubt as to whether property which is held primarily for resale con-
stitutes a capital asset, whether or not it is the type of property
which under good accounting practice would be included in the in-
ventory.' "9
By adding the italicized words-"property held by the taxpayer
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or
business"--Section 117 (b) of the Revenue Act of 1934 11" made possible
the argument that, by this amendment, Congress made the clause
96. Samuel Diescher, 36 B.T.A. 732, 743 (1937).
97., "'Capital assets' ... does not include stock in trade of the taxpayer or other
property of a kind which would properly be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if
on hand at the close of the taxable year ...." Revenue Act of 1932, § 101(c) (8), 47
STAT. 192 (1932).
98. 56 F2d 361 (1st Cir. 1932), reversing 21 B.T.A. 1245 (1931).
99. Id. at 362, quoting H.R. RerP. No. 179, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1923). Arthur J.
Hogan states that the enactment of the "trade or business" clause in 1924 "was not a
widely heralded change and no one seems to have regarded it as of any great significance
at that time." Hogan, The Capital Gains Tax, 9 TAx MA. 165, 167 (1931).
100. 48 STAT. 714 (1934).
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synonymous with the two preceding exclusionary categories. This
argument was rejected by Judge Learned Hand concurring in Gold.
smith v. Commissioner: 101
"[T]here may be also goods which are neither 'stock in trade' nor of
a kind which would ordinarily be inventoried. Nevertheless, the
business may consist of selling goods in 'ordinary course,' to those
whose custom the taxpayer seeks, and these are his 'customers.'
That the purpose of Congress was also not to treat such transac-
tions as 'capital gains and losses' is patent." 102
The fact of recurrent transactions has also received undue emphasis
in the administration of the British income tax. °3 Schedule D has long
authorized the taxation of " 'the annual profits or gains arising or
accruing . . . from any property whatever . . . or from any trade,
profession, employment or vocation.' " This language can be inter-
preted as excluding "profits from casual transactions not in the course
of a trade." 104 However, in a much-quoted report issued in 1920, a
Royal Commission on the Income Tax championed the view that,
although-
101. 143 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1944). Mr. Goldsmith, the author of a single stage play,
"spent his time in exploiting it in various ways," e.g., adapting it for radio broadcasting.
Judge Hand found that Goldsmith was "in 'business' as a playwright" and that the grant of
movie rights by him to Paramount Pictures constituted a sale of property held by the tax-
payer primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business.
102. Id. at 468. The paragraph continues: "Although each transaction is the sale
of 'property held by the taxpayer,' it is not considered as separate, but the transactions
are all massed together for tax purposes as a single source of ordinary income, quite as
though the taxpayer were giving his services for hire upon separate occasions. I-low
numerous such transactions must be the statute answers only by the test that collectively
they must constitute a 'trade or business.'" It would seem therefore, that where a man's
main occupation is the exploitation of his "brainchild," his profit upon its sale is to be
taxed as ordinary income, regardless of the absence of an "ordinary course" of preceding
sales or of a prior intention to hold the property "primarily for sale."
With reference to § 23(a) (1) of the statute authorizing the deduction of "all the
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying
on any trade or business," Justice Cardozo remarked: "Now, what is ordinary, though
there must always be a strain of constancy within it, is none the less a variable affected by
time and place and circumstance. Ordinary in this context does not mean that the payments
must be habitual or normal in the sense that the same taxpayer will have to make them
often .... [A situation may be] unique in the life of the individual affected, but not in
the life of the group, the community, of which he is a part." Welch v. Helvering, 290
U.S. 111, 113-114 (1933).
103. "The British have the time-honored practice of disregarding casual income and
rating a taxpayer for income tax purposes according to his regular receipts. This seems
to be one of those anomalous institutions with which British life abounds-about as
plausible as the British House of Lords." GRovEs, TRouBLE Sro'rs IN TAXATION 65
(1948).
104. MAGILL, TAXABLE INCOME 84 (1945). Cf. GRovEs, POSTWAR TAXATION AND
Ecoxomic PRoGRESS 207-11 (1946).
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"Profits that arise from ordinary changes of investment should
normally remain outside the scope of the tax . . . any profit made
on a transaction recognizable as a business transaction, i.e., a trans-
action in which the subject matter was acquired with a view to
profit-seeking, should be brought within the scope of the Income
Tax, and should not be treated as an accretion of capital simply be-
cause the transaction lies outside the range of the taxpayer's ordi-
nary business, or because the opportunities of making such profits
are not likely, in the nature of things, to occur regularly or at short
intervals." 105
Following this report, the British courts have tended to construe the
exemption of capital gains narrowly 110 and have imposed progressive
income tax rates upon the profits of numerous non-recurrent transac-
tions which would qualify for capital gains treatment under American
law. 107
B. The "Held Primarily for Sale" Requirement
Although an invention need not have constituted stock in trade to
be'excluded from the capital asset category under the "trade or bus-
iness" clause, it must have been "held primarily for sale." It was the
absence of this element, rather than the absence of repeated sales,
which controlled the Diescher case:
"So far as we know, the patents involved here are the first which
the partnership ever sold, although it has been in business for many
years. All of the other transactions having to do with the patents of
the partnership have been connected with the licensing of their
use." 103
As the "trade or business" clause refers to property "held primarily
for sale," the Board reasoned that it does not apply to property held
for licensing or for any purpose other than sale."' Although this retro-
105. REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMmissio ON THE Ixcom TAX, Cisn. No. 615, 90, 91
(1920) ; Note, 52 YALE L.J. 400 (1943).
106. MIAGuL, T.cx~Arx IxcomE 82-103 (1945). Lachs, Income Taxation of Capital
Profits, 6 MoD. L.R. 148 (1943); Mlay, The British Treatment of Capital Gains, 73
J. ACCOUNTANcy 505 (1942) ; Accrctions of Capital or Income Reecipts, 76 L.T. 85 (July
29,1933). But see Withers v. Nethersole, I All E.R. 400 (194S), discussed in Commissioner
v. Wodehouse, 337 U.S. 369, 422 (1949).
107. When the British scheme was proposed to a congressional committee in 1927, it
was rejected on the ground that: "The distinction between trader and nontrader is not a
desirable one to incorporate into our law." REPORT OF JoM'T Co ls o:N I.rE,-AL
REvmENE TxATioN 47 (1927). Cf. Haig, Taxation of Capital Gains, Wall Street Jour-
nal, March 25, 1937, p. 6; Paul, supra note 23, Exhibit 6; Gnovs, PosrwAn TAxAmo7
AN EcoNomic P.oGnEss, 209-10 (1946).
108. See 36 B.T.A. 732, 734 (1937), aff'd, 110 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1940). Because the
patents were depreciable property used in the trade or business of licensing, their sale
would, under present law, give rise to capital gain under INT. REv. CODE § 117(j).
109. CfL Edward C. Meyers, 6 T.C. 258 (1946); Leo P. Curtin, 6 T.C.M. 457 (1947).
1950]
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spective process is what the statute seems to command, one may well
question the relevance of the taxpayer's original intention to license
his patent, after he has changed his mind and has in fact obtained
profit from it by sale rather than by licensing. 10 There having been
a sale, it seems strange that the tax consequences of this event should
depend, not upon an examination of the measurable change it brought
about in the seller's financial capacity, but upon the uses to which the
property was put before it was sold.
C. The "Sale to Customers" Requirement
Even if an inventor holds his patent "primarily for sale," it does not
follow that his profit on its sale will be taxed as ordinary income. In
the case of William M. Kelly,"' the Tax Court found that the taxpayer-
inventor had held his patents "primarily for sale" 112 but decided that
the sale was not "to customers." "[Ait no time did petitioner ever
attempt to sell or license his patents to anyone other than the cor-
poration which employed him. . . .He was not, as to all his later in-
ventions and improvements, free to sell them to any customer" be-
cause of his contract to assign all his inventions to his employer."
3
Hence the patents did not constitute "property held by the taxpayer
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or
business."
It would indeed be an extraordinary phenomenon if the words "to
customers," inserted in the statute for the single express purpose of
restricting the loss deductions of professional speculators in securities," 4
110. Under the particular facts of the Diescher case, where the "buyer" corporation
represents substantially the same interests as the "seller" partnership, this argument has
less strength than in the more usual situation where the buyer is a stranger.
111. 6 T.C.M. 646 (1947).
112. This finding was necessary to the Tax Court's conclusion that the patents were
not excluded from the capital asset category as "property ...used in the trade or busi-
ness, of a character which is subject to the allowance for depreciation provided in § 23 (1)."
INT. REV. CODE § 117(a) (1). "Section 23(1) of the Code provides a reasonable allow-
ance for the exhaustion, wear and tear, only of property used in the trade or business,
or held for the production of income. Property held primarily for sale is not, therefore,
subject to an allowance for depreciation. There is no suggestion in the record that peti-
tioner used these patents in any business of his own or held them .. for the production
of income. Hence they are not excluded from the category of capital assets by virtue
of being depreciable." William M. Kelly, 6 T.C.M. 646, 649 (1947). Cl. James . Adam-
son, 5 T.C.M. 1071 (1946), aff'd, 161 F.2d 942 (9th Cir. 1947). Since the enactment of
INT. REv. CoDE § 117(j) in 1942, the sale of depreciable business property held for more
than six months gives rise either to capital gain or ordinary loss.
113. 6 T.C.M. 1071 (1946). Similarly, Avery was obliged by his employment contract
to assign his later inventions to his employer; nevertheless when he sold his employer an
invention not covered by the contract, it was held that the employer was a "customer."
Of Avery's two previous sales, one was to his employer and one to an outsider. Harold T.
Avery, 47 B.T.A. 538, 542 (1942).
114. See discussion in Section I supra.
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were the cause of an inventor's income being taxed at capital gain rates.
The Kelly decision, however, could have been reached without the
"customers" argument since Mr. Kelly had not been engaged in a
continuing course of selling. Hence it would seem that, at least in
patent cases, the concept of a sale "to customers" does little more than
restate the requirements that "business" involve the execution of
repeated transactions and that these transactions must be sales.
D. The Overlapping of the Requirements
The preceding cases on sales of patents by their inventors serve to
demonstrate that the words "property held primarily for sale to cus-
tomers in the ordinary course of trade or business" embody not one
but a whole series of capital gain tests. Thus, in the course of a Tax
Court decision 115 taxing as capital gain an award made to the tax-
payer for patent infringement most of these overlapping criteria were
invoked. Notwithstanding its finding that the taxpayer had been
"engaged since 1910 in the business of inventing, developing, and ex-
ploiting inventions for profit," the Tax Court reasoned:
"The evidence shows, however, that Barlow was not in the bus-
iness of selling 116 inventions or patents. He had no 'customers' in
an ordinary course of business. Of his many and various inven-
tions, he sold only the drop bomb invention in 1917 [and one other]
not in the ordinary course of business, but because of special cir-
cumstances. In view of the careful definition of the term capital
assets in Section 117(a) (1), it is not permissible to exclude patents
or inventions which are not held for sale to customers, but only
licensed by one who is in business as an inventor and derives gain
from giving licenses on his inventions." 117
115. Lester T. Barlow, P-H 1943 TC f m. DEc. 1143,237. Barlow invented a drop
bomb in the summer of 1914. In 1917 he sold all his rights under the invention to
Marlin (who became the original patentee) in consideration of $50,000 cash and 495 of
the profits or royalties. In 1923 Marlin went into receivership and in settlement of
Barlow's rights under the 1917 contract of sale, Marlin assigned to Barlow the invention,
the patent rights, and farlin's claim against the United States for infringement or "for
use of the invention" In 1940 Barlow received 96,359.60 from the United States in
partial payment of an award made by the Court of Claims. Barlow's cost for the inven-
tion was zero. It was held that the award from the United States was ta able as long-
term capital gain.
116. The Tax Court admitted: "The decision in Harold T. Avery, 47 B.T.A. 539,
contains language suggesting that one who holds patents which he licenses to others at a
profit may for that reason be denied the capital gain provision." Lester T. Barlow aP-H
1943 TC ME . DFc. 1 43,237, pp. 43-761, 43-762. What the Avery opinion said was:
"Until disposed of, his patents -were held primarily for sale or other disposition to cas-
tomers." 47 B.T.A. 538, 542. This statement was dismissed as a dictum by the Barlow
opinion, apparently because Avery had been found to be in the business of selling. Yet
it is at least arguable that Avery had not held his patents "primarily" for sale becamuse he
had licensed just as many as he had sold prior to the sale in issue.
117. Nevertheless, the Commissioner continues to resist inventors who claim the
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To the cumulative effect of all these arguments, the reader must
nod his head in assent-until he pauses to consider just what is being
done. A statutory provision, supposedly justified by the desirability
of special tax treatment for "investment," has been employed to re-
duce the taxes of a man who cannot possibly be considered an "in-
vestor." Perhaps it is in the public interest to offer special tax in-
centives to inventors. Yet it is hard to see how such a policy can be
invoked to justify the application of the present capital gains provisions
which capriciously confer a "subsidy" on some inventors but withhold
it from others because of the operation of such irrelevant factors as
''sale to customers," "course of business," and "held primarily for
sale." Such fantastic tax consequences suggest that the validity of the
present treatment of capital gains should be re-evaluated, not only in
terms of the abstract theorizing that is usually put forward to justify
it,' but also in the light of how the law operates in practice." 9 It is
the purpose of the next Section to examine the workings of the various
concepts latent within the "trade or business" clause in a wide variety
of factual situations more commonplace than the sale of a patent by an
inventor. From this survey it will be possible to draw conclusions as to
just how well the present law succeeds in doing what it purports to do
-to segregate "investment" from "business."
IV. THE DISTINCTION BETVEEN BUSINESS AND INVESTMENT-HOW
WELL IT IS EFFECTUATED BY THE "TRADE
OR BUSINESS" CLAUSE
In order to estimate how well the "trade or business" clause distin-
guishes between "business" and "investment," it is necessary first to
consider the import of these terms. The word "investment" has
innumerable connotations. To define it as the holding of property
for the enjoyment of a more or less periodic yield may serve to distin-
guish it from "speculation," but when contrasted with "business,"
benefit of the long-term capital gains treatment. His intransigence is attributable, at least
in part, to the fact that the typical inventor holds his patent at a low cost basis so that loss
is seldom realized upon its sale. If patents held by inventors were removed from the
capital asset category, the increased revenue collected from successful inventors would
not be offset to any appreciable extent by the increased loss deductions which would then
be permitted to unsuccessful inventors. Another factor conducive to continuing litigation
is the constant flow of new decisions which, in applying section 117 to sales of corporate
securities, real estates, etc., contain language inconsistent with that used in the patent
cases, e.g., "Nor is it fatal that those to whom the sales were made were not regular or
recurrent patrons. The subject matter of the sale was not conducive to repetition."
J. L. Greene, P-H 1942 BTA and TC Mimn. DEC. 142,582, 42-1505 (sale of oil prop-
erties).
118. See Section VI infra.
119. Cf. Lowndes, The Taxation of Capital Gains and Losses tnder the Federal In-
come Tax, 26 TExAs L. Ray. 440, 441, 454 (1948).
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such a definition is altogether inadequate. 120 Thus the entrepreneur
may speak of plant, machinery, and.even inventory as representing
his "investment"; yet such assets are very different from his Govern-
ment bonds, characterized as "investments" by his accountant, which
produce periodic income without any productive activity by their
owner. The holder of a few shares of General Motors is seldom re-
garded as being in the automobile business; yet it is hard to discover
the precise point at which to draw the line between him and the local
shopkeeper who incorporates.
A. Is Busyness Business?
It has been suggested that the "test of being in business . . . must
be broadly the amount of time and attention that you give to the
particular type of activity." 121 This test has received judicial ap-
proval:
"This taxpayer must, to defeat his claim to a capital gains rate,
have been in the business of selling his lands. An occasional sale
of land held as an investment is not such a business though profit
results. The word, notwithstanding disguise in spelling and pro-
nunciation, means busyness; it implies that one is kept more or less
busy, that the activity is an occupation. It need not be one's sole
occupation, nor take all his time.122 It ordinarily is implied that
one's o n attention and effort are involved, but the maxim quifacil
per alium facit per se applies, and one may carry on a business
through agents whom he supervises." 123
Although this approach is orthodox in cases involving sales of real
estate, it has been decreed heresy where securities are involved. In
Higgins v. Commissioner,224 the Supreme Court held that the statutory
provision permitting the deduction of "expenses paid or incurred in
carrying on any trade or business" 125 did not apply to the substantial
outlays made by the taxpayer in looking after his investments in secu-
rities.12 6 Mr. Higgins had resided in France but "by cable, telephone,
120. For example, the courts have said that "property originally acquired for pur-
poses of resale at a profit," was not necessarily excluded from the investment category;
its "resale by the taxpayer does not of itself give the taxpayer the status of one being in
the real estate business." Phipps v. Commissioner, 54 F2d 469 (2d Cir. 1931). Cf.
Harriss v. Commissioner, 143 F2d 279, 280, 281 (2d Cir. 1944). Similarly, the possibility
of "holding an investment for sale" is contrasted with business in Boomhower v. United
States, 74 F. Supp. 997, 1004 (N.D. Iowa 1947).
121. Eustace Seligman in CAPrrAL GAINs TAXATo- 45 (Tax Institute Symposium,
1946).
122. Cf., e.g., Snyder v. Commissioner, 295 U.S. 134, 138 (1935) and other cases too
numerous for citation.
123. Snell v. Commissioner, 97 F.2d 891, 892 (5th Cir. 1938).
124. 312U.S. 212 (1941).
125. Now IxT. REv. CoDE § 23(a) (1).
126. "The line comes between those who are in the position of passive investors, doing
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and mail . . . kept a watchful eye over his securities" and over his
New York and Paris offices which "kept records, received securities,
interest and dividend checks, made deposits, forwarded weekly and
annual reports. . . . He sought permanent investments . . ." rather
than speculative profits, changes in his portfolio being attributable to
redemptions, maturities, and the like. Despite the real estate cases
supporting Mr. Higgins' contention that "the 'elements of continuity,
constant repetition, regularity and extent' differentiate his activities
from the occasional like actions of the small investor" so as to con-
stitute "carrying on business," 121 the Court upheld the Commissioner
who insisted that "mere personal investment activities never constitute
carrying on a trade or business, no matter how much of one's time or
one's employees' time they may occupy." 128
Although the Higgins case has relevance to the present discussion
because a later case 129 has said that this interpretation of "trade or
business" is applicable, not only to the deduction of expenses, but also
to the definition of capital assets, 30 the really significant aspect of this
decision lies in the fact that Section 23(a) which provides for the de-
duction of expenses does not qualify the term "business" with "held
primarily for sale to customers" as does the present Section 117 which
defines capital assets. Thus it was not the statute but only the power-
ful connotations of the word "business" which led the Court to subject
Mr. Higgins to an unjust tax on his gross income by denying him the
right to offset his dividend and interest income with his outlay in
securing that income. It is the very preposterousness of this result,
promptly overruled by statute,' that highlights the tremendous force
of the concept which dominated the Court's thinking, i.e., that there
cannot be such a thing as a business of investing in securities.
only what is necessary from an investment point of view, and those who associate them-
selves actively in the enterprises in which they are financially interested and devote a
substantial part of their time to that work as a matter of business." Foss v. Commls-
sioner, 75 F.2d 326, 328 (1st Cir. 1935). Cf. Miller v. Commissioner, 102 F.2d 476, 479
(9th Cir. 1939) ; Bedell v. Commissioner, 30 F.2d 622, 624 (2d Cir. 1929).
127. "From the cases [on sales of real estate] it would appear that the facts necessary
to create the status of one engaged in 'trade or business' revolve largely around the fre-
quency or continuity of the transactions claimed to result in a 'business' status." Com-
missioner v. Boeing, 106 F.2d 305, 309 (9th Cir. 1939).
128. Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212, 215 (1941). The words are the Com-
missioner's.
129. United States v. Wooten, 132 F.2d 400,402 (5th Cir. 1942).
130. Any sales by Higgins would, of course, generate capital, rather than ordinary,
gains and losses under the criteria set forth in Achille 0. Van Suetendael, 3 T.C.M. 987
(1944), aff'd, 152 F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 1945), discussed on pages 848-9 .tpra.
131. Revenue Act of 1942, § 121 (a), 56 STAT. 819 (1942), added INT. REV. CoDn
§ 23 (a) (2) providing for the deduction of "expenses paid or incurred . . . for the produc-
tion or collection of income, or for the management, conservation, or maintenance of prop-
erty held for the production of income."
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B. Is Business Busyness?
The Higgins decision suggests that even a large "amount of time and
attention" 132 is by itself insufficient to characterize economic behavior
as "business" rather than as "investment." Cases like Brown v. Com-
missioner 133 show that an utter absence of any personal expenditure
of "time and attention" does not prevent the taxpayer from being
classified as engaged in "business" rather than investment. Upon her
husband's death in 1928 Mrs. Brown received as his sole asset his com-
munity property interest in 500 acres of unimproved grazing land
covered by a mortgage held by a bank. The bank demanded payment
and so, early in 1929, Mrs. Brown listed the land for sale with a licensed
real estate broker. Having failed to sell the tract after eight years, the
broker began to subdivide it with Mrs. Brmm's consent, having
streets cleared, sewers, gas, and electric lines constructed, etc. The
proceeds from sale of the lots from 1937 through 1939 were held taxable
as ordinary income and not as capital gain.
"While the petitioner did not personally conduct the business of
selling lots, she did conduct it through another .... Her sales
were not isolated transactions; neither were they casual rather than
continuing. They were substantial and frequent... ." 134
It is at once apparent that the facts of Mr. Higgins' case exhibit
many indicia of "business" not present in Mrs. Brown's case. Mr.
Higgins was to some extent personally occupied; irs. Brown did not
even exercise that supervision with which the Snell opinion 13 qualifies
the doing of business through agents."' Whereas he made purchases
132. See text at note 121 spra.
133. 143 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1944).
134. Id. at 470. Mirs. Brown's case is to be contrasted with that of Mfinnie Steinau
Loewenburg, 7 T.C.M. 702 (1948), a widow who inherited from her husband a note
secured by a mortgage on land which had already been subdivided and improved. After
foreclosure and without making any further improvements, Mrs. Lowenburg sold several
lots, at intervals of a year or two, to purchasers who came to her unsolicited and on their
own initiative. The Tax Court held that she had realized capital gain and not ordinary
income. Thus, merely because Mirs. Lowenburg acquired her land after it had been im-
proved and sold the lots sloswly, she was taxed differently than Airs. Brown. Cf. Frieda
E. J. Farley, 7 T.C. 198 (1946).
For a representative sampling of the hodgepodge of decisions on real estate sales, see
Boemhower v. United States, 74 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Iowa 1947). Cf. Fink, "Dcaling"
it; Real Estate, 2 TAx L. REv. 111 (1946).
135. See text at note 123 supra.
136. It is difficult to foretell just when the agency contept will be used to canvAl out the
"time and attention" concept. The Brozon case may profitably be contrasted with Rey-
nolds v. Commissioner, 155 F2d 620 (1st Cir. 1946), afflniing P-H 1945 TC MsAl. DEc.
45,276. Along with other properties, Reynolds inherited $523,000 worth of jewelry
from his aunt. Like Mrs. Brown he employed an "agent," the Cartier jewelry firm, to
"subdivide" his legacy. In 1940 he received $3,500 upon an isolated sale of a neckace
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as well as sales as part of a continuing procedure for making a living,
she was merely liquidating a single asset acquired by bequest. 3 '
C. Is Business a Qualitative Concept?
If time and attention do not constitute business, what does? Cases
like United States v. Robinson 138 suggest that business status depends
less upon how much the seller does than upon what he does. Miss Robin-
son and her brothers and sisters formed a partnership to manage the
extensive properties left to them by their father. The partnership
carried on a substantial farm and ranch business and extensive oil,
gas, and mineral leasing activities; it received a large rental income
from 75 city houses and 140 tenant farms, and "carried on a money
lending business larger than the two regular banks in the town." The
firm also entered into several long term contracts to sell timber on its
valued at $5,000 for estate tax purposes. It was held that his $1,500 "loss" had resulted
from a transaction entered into for profit within INT. REV. CODE § 23(e) (2), citing Estelle
G. Marx, 5 T.C. 173 (1945), but that he might deduct it only to the extent permitted a
capital loss, because of the Tax Court's finding that "in the management or liquidation
of his own properties, including those acquired under his aunt's will, petitioner was not
engaged in a trade or business." This result may be reconciled with the Brown case on
the ground that Mr. Reynolds sold but one piece of jewelry whereas Mrs. Brown sold
many building lots-and hence was engaged in a "course of business." Less easy to
reconcile is the court's disposition of Mr. Reynold's contention "that the efforts of
Cartier's to sell the jewelry, involving the efforts of fifteen or more persons, and includ-
ing advertising, exhibiting and negotiating with possible purchasers, would have been a
business if carried on by Cartier for its own account and is no less so because carried
on for the account of the petitioner." The Tax Court responded: "Cartier is engaged
in the jewelry business, regardless of its contract with petitioner. Ve do not agree that
the owner of property placed with an agent for sale is thereby engaged in the same busi-
ness as the agent." P-H 1945 TC MEm. DEC. 1 45,276, at 45-933.
Cf. Pope v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 599 (6th Cir. 1935), in which the court refused
to find that "a director and officer of a corporation, owning a substantial amount of its
stock but not active in its affairs, is engaged in the business in which the corporation is
engaged." Id. at 600.
137. "In effect, what the taxpayer was doing was to render more attractive a capital
asset already owned, in order to sell it, in much the same way as an owner would paint
and redecorate an old house, and landscape the grounds, in order that his broker could
more readily dispose of it for him." Falis v. Crawford, 161 F.2d 315, 317 (5th Cir. 1947).
"In the present case the plaintiff found himself the owner of a tract which was unsaleable
in its unplatted and unimproved condition. . . . Such improvement [as plaintiff made]
only constituted the placing of the property in saleable condition and did not give him
the status of one engaged in the real estate business." Boomhower v. United States,
74 F. Supp. 997, 1009 (N.D. Iowa 1947).
The Bronzr opinion, 143 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1944), follows the opposite approach, as
does Ehrman v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 607, 610 (9th Cir. 1941) : "We fail to see that
the reasons behind a person's entering a business-whether it is to make money or to
liquidate--should be determinative of the question of whether or not the gains resulting
from the sale are ordinary gains or capital gains. The sole question is--were the tag-
payers in the business of subdividing real estate ?"
138. 129 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1942).
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lands to companies "engaged in the business of purchasing timber,
cutting it into logs and lumber for sale to the public." The court held
that Miss Robinson's share of the proceeds of these contracts for the
sale of the timber was taxable only as capital gain. This result was
subsequently codified in Section 117(k) of the Internal Revenue Code,
providing for special treatment of timber sales. 1'1
Although Miss Robinson had no more to do with the sale of the
timber than Mrs. Brown with the sale of the lots,14 0 it would seem
that she was no less in "business." The partnership of which Miss
Robinson was a member was certainly engaged in a vigorous "course
of business." Part of the business (farm and ranch) involved recurrent
sales "to customers." The timber sold was apparently held "primarily
for sale" rather than for any other purpose. Under conventional part-
nership law the business was conducted by "agents" of Miss Robinson.
Nevertheless Miss Robinson's profit on the sale was held not to con-
stitute business profit because "the partnership was not in the business
of selling timber," i.e., it had never sold timber before, and therefore
"the timber sold was not held by it for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of its trade or business." 141 Had the partners decided to have
the timber cut and marketed by some of their farm employees, Iiss
Robinson's share of any profit upon its sale would probably, under the
pre-1942 statute, have been taxed as ordinary income,142 despite the
139. Added by Revenue Act of 1943, § 127 (a), 53 STAT. 46 (1944).
140. The court found that Miss Robinson "is not and has never been personally en-
gaged in any kind of business."
141. Cf. Isaac S. Peebles, Jr., 5 T.C. 14 (1945).
142. Thus in Commissioner v. Boeing, 106 F2d 305 (9th Cir. 1939), the taxpayer had
by inheritance and purchase acquired co-oxwMership of large tracts of timberland which
he held "for investment purposes." Along with his co-owners he contracted to "employ"
two logging companies which agreed to construct logging railroads, logging camps, and
other necessary structures at their'own expense, to cut and remove a minimum quantity
of timber each year, to transport the timber and sell it to purchasers at the current market
price, and to pay one-third of the gross proceeds to the owners. One of the contracts
provided that title to all the logs was to remain in the owners at all times until sold and
that the purchasers were to be billed separately for the amount due the owners to whom
remittance was to be made directly. Although "the taxpayer gave practically no time or
attention to the operations under these contracts during the taxable years involved," the
court of appeals found that he was in the business of selling logs and reversed the Board of
Tax Appeals which had held that he had realized mere capital gain and had reasoned that
his sales were "casual," that there was "no continuous course of dealings with a group of
regular buyers," and that the sales were "isolated transactions ... involving merely casual
buyers, as distinguished from 'customers."
tjnable to hurdle the "trade or business" wall around the capital gam category,
timber owners have nevertheless tunneled their way into the happy land. Iur. Rnv. CoDs
§ 117(k) (2) provides that timber held for more than six months may be disposed of at
capital gain rates "under any form or type of contract by virtue of which the owner
retains an economic interest in such timber," irrespective of whether the sale would
generate ordinary business profit under the tests applied to sales of all other kinds of
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absence of prior sales of timber. 14 Hence the decisive element appears
to be the fact that Miss Robinson (like Mr. Higgins) did nothing to the
property before she sold it, unlike Mrs. Brown who, through her agents,
developed her land for sale. Thus it would seem that "business"
status depends far less upon "the amount of time and attention" ex-
pended than it does upon the nature of "the particular type of activ-
ity," 144 and that the distinction between business and investment is
as much qualitative as quantitative.
This is implicit, not only in the Higgins case,' 45 but also in the tests-
set forth in the Van Suetendael case 146-for distinguishing the long-
term profits of the securities merchant from those of the professional
securities speculator who, like the investor, is treated as a seller of
"capital assets." For example, the requirement that a true, securities
business involves buying at wholesale and selling at retail is much akin
to the notion that a true timber business involves the cutting and mar-
keting of timber by the seller, at least in the case of an isolated sale. In
both cases the law refuses to find a business unless there is present what,
for want of a better term, may be called an "economic transformation."
However the analogy is incomplete. Whereas in the real estate field
a large volume of sales of unaltered property may take the place of an
"economic transformation," mere volume of sales can never replace
the prerequisite of "economic transformation" necessary to the find-
ing of a securities business. 1
47
The discrepancy between the rules applied in these two areas springs,
of course, from the inevitable resort to common usage to determine
what constitutes a "business" in any given field of activity. The
Robinson case illustrates the futility of this enterprise. Because the
timber sold by Miss Robinson was the first she had ever sold, and be-
cause it was not sawed, carted away and marketed by her own employ-
ees, timbermen would not consider her to be. in the timber business. Yet
it is patent that the change in Miss Robinson's economic position was
property. Such legislative favoritism does not imply that the prior judicial interpretations
of § 117(a) were erroneous but indicates merely that the substantial benefits accorded
to sales of capital assets are a standing invitation to interested groups with sufficlent
influence to secure lower taxes for themselves without regard to the policies which sup-
posedly justify the special treatment of capital transactions.
143. The Robinson opinion, 129 F.2d 291, 300 (5th Cir. 1942), recognizes "that the
liquidation of the timber ... could have been conducted in such fashion" as to generate
ordinary business profit, citing Commissioner v. Boeing, 106 F.2d 305 (9th Cir. 1939) ;
Ehrman v. Commissioner, 120 F.2d 607 (9th Cir. 1941); Welch v. Solomon, 99 F.2d 41
(9th Cir. 1938) ; Richards v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 369 (9th Cir. 1936).
144. See text at note 121 supra.
145. 312 U.S. 212 (1941).
146. 3 T.C.M. 987 (1944), aff'd., 152 F.2d 654 (2d Cir. 1945). See pages 848-9 sispra.
147. This is because of the words "to customers" in the "trade or business" clause.
See discussion of legislative history in Section I supra.
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the same, regardless of whether the men who cut and transported
the trees were employed by her or by the buyer. Why then should
the tax law concern itself with irrelevant considerations of this sort?
D. Is tie Business Concept a Valid Measure of Taxpaying Ability?
The legal status quo has been defended by Thomas N. Tarleau:
"Taxpayers have frequently complained that the Treasury is ut-
terly unreasonable in finding as few as ten or fifteen transactions in
real estate in one year constitute a business so that the profits are
ordinary income, while several hundred transactions in the [stock]
market may be made and taxed only at capital gain rates. Per-
sonally, I think that is right, because what we are looking for is
a trade or business concept, and the number of transactions that
constitute a trade or business varies in different fields of endeavor.
I think if I sold fifteen or twenty parcels of real estate down in Flor-
ida in the course of a year, the extent to which that constitutes
business is different from having fifteen or twenty phone calls to
my broker in New York." 148
The essential fallacy of this argument lies in the attempt to reason in
tax matters from preconceived notions about "business" derived from
popular usage or developed in other branches of the law for purposes "I
having little or no relevance to the problem of taxing similarly-circum-
stanced persons similarly. Thus Mr. Tarleau asserts that "[a] person
can be a lawyer and have a number of stock transactions which still
don't constitute a sufficient participation in a trade or business to
justify taxing the [profits as] ordinary income." 1-'9 But what is so
magical about "business" that to come within its connotations auto-
matically increases one's ability to pay taxes? On the contrary, itwould
seem that the person engaged in business has often a lesser capacity
than one who is not so engaged but who receives an equivalent in-
come; the law does not take into account the businessman's expenditure
of energy and the wear and tear on his "human capital." 1" Further-
more, it is extraordinary that a society so deeply concerned with the
fostering of productive activity should, by its tax laws, reward people
who refrain from engaging in transactions for fear that their sales will
constitute a "business." Even if one assumes the validity of some of the
arguments advanced in support of the view that gains realized upon
148. CiPrrALm s Gin  T .Tmo 42 (Tax Institute Symposium, 1946).
149. E.g., the concept of "doing business" employed in determining jurisdiction over
foreign corporations. Cf. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310
(1945).
150. CrrAL GAINS TAXATION 42 (Tax Institute Symposium, 1946) (emphasis
added).
151. Silverson, Earned Income and Ability to Pay, 3 TAx L. R'v. 299, and especially
note 5 (1948).
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sales of property do not always augment the seller's economic position
to the same extent as income from other sources,5 2 these arguments
have little or nothing to do with whether the seller is regarded in trade
circles as a "professional." Inquiry as to the nature or "the number of
transactions that constitute a trade or business .. . in different fields
of endeavor" 113 is altogether irrelevant to whether a particular receipt
of money (or other property) results in bettering the recipient's relative
economic position in the community to such an extent that the dollar
amount of the receipt represents a fair measure of the increase in the
recipient's ability to contribute to the support of the Government."5 4
In overruling the Higgins case "I by permitting the deduction of
"expenses paid or incurred . . . for the production or collection
of income," "I regardless of whether incurred in connection with
"business," Congress recognized that the judicial interpretation of
"business" was narrow, artificial, and unfair, and that, for tax de-
duction purposes, no valid distinction can be made among the various
types of profit-making activity according to whether they happen
to come within the irrelevant connotations of words like "business"
and "investment."
E. Is the Sale of Rented Real Estate a Business Transaction?
The anomaly of taxing the sale of Miss Robinson's legacy "I differ-
ently from the sale of Mrs. Brown's "I hhs been characterized as a
bizarre "borderline" situation which does not truly test the validity
of the distinction between business and investment.' However,
152. See Section VI infra.
153. CAPITAL GAIxS TAXATIN 42 (Tax Institute Symposium, 1946).
154. The classic definition of taxable income includes "power exercised for consump-
tion purposes": "The appropriate general conception of income, for purposes of personal
taxation, may be defined as the algebraic sum of the individual's consumption expense
and accumulation during the accounting period." SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATI0X
206 (1938). See definition by R. M. Haig, cited in Lutz, Should Capital Gains be Ta.xed as
Income, 22 BULL. NAT. TAX ASS'N 130, 131 (1937). Ci. HEw-rT, Tn. DEFIm 0x OF IN-
COME AND ITS APPLICATION IN FEDERAL TAXATION 34 (1925).
155. 312 U.S. 212 (1941).
156. See note 131 supra.
157. 129 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1942).
158. 143 F2d 468 (5th Cir. 1944).
159. Professor Seltzer: "They both sold their legacies .... Is there sufficient differ-
ence in the kind of income these two [taxpayers] derive to justify you in saying that we
will tax one on one basis, and the other on another? . . . .I]f . .. there isnt a great
deal of difference in substance, the question is raised as to whether you [should] make
a distinction between capital gains and other income."
Mr. Seligman: "Isn't the answer [that] in every classification in science and every-
thing else . . . when you get-two cases on the edge of the line in Class A and Class B,
those two cases look pretty much alike. That doesn't mean that if you take Class A as
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the classification of loss realized upon the sale of real estate held
for rental purposes is certainly an every-day, run-of-the-mill question.
Nevertheless this prosaic question was the subject of a controversy Ic0
generated by the very same set of inconsistent concepts which were
responsible for the anomalous results in the Robinson and Brown cases.
For example, in deciding that Mr. Fackler's sale of a 99-year lease-
hold in a six-story office building was a sale of "property used in trade
or business," 161 the court of appeals felt obliged to show that he "was
not holding the property merely as an investment and solely for the
purpose of collecting rents without rendering personal service to ten-
ants." This was done by demonstrating that the "management of the
property necessarily involved alterations and repairs . .. [the
furnishing of] elevator service, heat, light, and water which required
regular and continuous activity and the employment of labor, the
buying of material and many other things which come within the
definition of business." Confronted with the "difficulty . . . that
petitioner here was engaged in a profession which admittedly occupied
all of his business hours," the court responded that "there is such a
thing as carrying on a business through agents."
Here again is the same futile process of setting up an artificial an-
tithesis between "investment" and "business" in terms of personal
activity, and then circumventing it by finding such personal activity
in another legal fiction-doing business through agents-despite the
fact that little truly personal activity is present. The court succeeds
in pulling the rabbit out of the hat because the court hid it there. The
incantation of the hocus-pocus about "business" and "investment"
with which the court accompanies its feat of prestidigitation may de-
lude the unsuspecting into a belief that these words really compel the
result. Yet Mr. Fackler's activities might easily be characterized as
"investment" rather than as "business." Thus it appears that even
in this simple factual context, these categories are not mutually ex-
a whole and B as a whole, there isn't a difference. You are just taking the borderline
cases and saying that they are almost the same." CAPITAL GAI.NS TAxATIo., 45 (Tax In-
stitute Symposium, 1946).
160. Berguido, Rental Property as "Business" Property, 25 TAXEs 112 (1947);
Dane, Wihen is Real Estate Held for the Production of Incomne Used in the Trade or
Business of the Taxpayer?, 59 I-AIv. L. REV. 119 (1945) ; Roehner, Tax Court in Error in
Holding All Rental Property is "Used its Trade or Business", 25 TAXES 1000 (1947);
Silverman, Is Loss on Sale of Real Property Ordinary or Long-Termn Capital Loss?,
24 TAXES 1154 (1946).
161. Faclder v. Commissioner, 133 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1943) (decided under the law
of 1938 which excluded from the definition of capital assets "property used in trade or
business, of a character which is subject to the allowance for depreciation provided in sec-
tion 23(1)"). Faclder's leasehold was held to be depreciable under 23(1) because found
to have been used in a business. After 1942 the sale of such property would generate
captital gain under IxT. REv. CODE § 117(j).
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elusive, have no self-evident meanings, and are merely elliptical sym-
bols for opposite legal conclusions. Accordingly it should be recognized
that the attempt to reason from such premises must be a circular and
futile process.
This confusion of legal fiction with economic fact has continued to ob-
fuscate the taxation of rental property. The Revenue Act of 1942 102
removed "real property used in the trade or business of the taxpayer"
from within the definition of capital assets in Section 117(a)(1) and
placed it in a new Section, 117(j), providing that any long-term gains
realized upon sale of property within this category would be taxed only
up to the same low flat 25% rate which applies to capital assets under
117(a), but that losses might be deducted in full and not merely to the
limited extent permitted in the case of capital assets. I" The Treasury
promptly promulgated an interpretation 164 of the phrase "real property
used in the trade or business of the taxpayer" which implied that rented
real estate would fall within the phrase only if the taxpayer could show
himself to be in the business of renting his property rather than merely
holding it for the production of income as a passive investor.""' This
interpretation obviously stems from the concept set forth by the
Supreme Court in the Higgins opinion 166 that investment is somehow
intrinsically and qualitatively different from business.
In contending that all losses upon the sale of all rented real estate
fall outside 117(a)(1) and within 117(j), spokesmen for taxpayers
emphasized that, prior to the enactment in 1942 of Sections 23(a) (2)
and 23(1)(2) which explicitly authorize the deduction of expenses and
depreciation in connection with income-producing property, 167 owners
of rented real estate were permitted to take deductions for depreciation,
maintenance costs, repairs, etc. on the theory that these deductions
were "incurred in trade or business" under Sections 23(a) (1) and 23(l)
(1). A lessor was not required to spend any time in managing the
property in order to obtain the deductions. Had this not been per-
162. Revenue Act of 1942, § 151, 56 STAT. 846 (1942).
163. Because § 117(j) (2) requires that gains and losses from sales of this type of
property and from "involuntary conversions" be offset against each other, it is the net
gain from the combined transactions which enjoys 25% ceiling rate and the net loss which
is fully deductible from ordinary income. Cf. Lowndes, supra note 119, at 450.
164. "Property held for the production of income, but not used in a trade or business
of the taxpayer, is not excluded from the term 'capital assets' even though depreciation
may have been allowed with respect to such property under Section 23(1) prior to its
amendment by the Revenue Act of 1942." T.D. 5217, 1943 Cum. BuLt. 319.
165. This interpretation has been approved on the ground that "[tihe language in the
Senate Report [SEN. Rm. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 50 (1942)] would seem to show
that Section 117(j) was intended to apply not to rental property but only to real estate
and buildings used as subsidiary to non-rental purposes, such as manufacturing." Roeh-
ner, smpra note 160, at 1013.
166. 312 U.S. 212 (1941).
167. See note 131 supra.
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mitted, he would have been taxed on gross rather than net rentals.
"In the absence of any specific indication to the contrary, the words
'used in the trade or business' must have the same meaning in Section
117(a)(1) [and also 117(j)] that they had for many years in Section
23(1)." 168 Hence, contrary to the Treasury's interpretation, ' man-
agement activity would be unnecessary.r 0
It is submitted that the taxpayer's position was correct 17 --not
because the same words must necessarily always mean the same thing
regardless of their context-but because the decrease in economic
power suffered by the real estate owner is the full amount of his loss
upon the sale, and whether or not he can be said to have managed the
property before selling it has little, if any, relevance to this fact. True,
1176) puts the taxpayer in a heads-I-win-tails-you-lose position with
respect to the Treasury. However, it is an artificial symmetry which,
because Congress has not seen fit to tax profits on these sales as ordi-
nary income, would refuse to permit losses on such sales to be deducted
as ordinary losses. As the late Professor Simons pointed out, "There
can be little reason for limiting loss deductions for some taxpayers
because others have enjoyed concessions as to capital gains." 172
F. What Is a Businessman's Business?
The pernicious consequences of a narrow conception of "business"
are not confined to persons outside the popular stereotype of "the
businessman," such as Mr. Higgins 7 3 Miss Robinson 174 and Mr.
Fackler. 175 In many commercial situations taxpayers incontrovertibly
engaged in business incur a gain or loss upon a transaction falling some-
what outside the scope of their usual activities. Because of the conno-
tations of the word "business," such taxpayers are often taxed too
much or too little.
This problem is exemplified by the case of the Thompson Lvurber
Co.,'7 6 which during the depression of the 1930's acquired considerable
16. Dane, supra note 160, at 124. Compare the Board of Tax Appeal's opinion in
the Fackler case, 45 B.T.. 708 (1941).
169. See note 164 zupra.
170. Leland Hazard, 7 T.C. 372 (1946), acq., 1946-2 Cum-. BuLl. 3, adopts this iew
of § 117(j).
171. Le., that proof of management activity should not be required before the tax-
payer is permitted full deduction of loss upon the sale of rented real estate.
172. SImoNs, supra note 154, at 160. Cf. REPoRT oF JomT Cmr4rrn= o ITamfAL
RmvNxu TAxATION 7 (1927) ; Professor Lawrence H. Seltzer in CAPITAL Ganzs TAA-
Tiox, supra note 159, at 13; Lowndes, supra note 119, at 448.
173. 312 U.S. 212 (1941).
174. 129 F2d 297 (5th Cir. 1942).
175. 133 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1943).
176. 43 B.T.A. 726 (1941).
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real estate 177 in payment of accounts receivable for lumber sold by it
and by way of foreclosure of liens. The Board of Tax Appeals held
that the losses sustained by the company upon sale of eight of these
properties in 1936 were only capital losses on the ground that its real
estate activities were only "incidental" to its lumber business and
were not of sufficient magnitude to constitute an additional business.
"[Petitioner] made no purchases of such property for sale to cus-
tomers. Its real estate (other than lumber yards) appears to have
been acquired solely for the purpose of minimizing or preventing
loss upon lumber and building materials sold by it. The time de-
voted by petitioner's officers and employees to disposing of its real
estate was infinitesimal in comparison with the time devoted to the
lumber or material business. So far as the record shows, petitioner
never held itself out to be engaged in the real estate business to
any extent . . . [but only] . . . in the wholesale and retail lumber
business. This clearly was its real business and its 'customers' were
. . . only the purchasers of lumber. ... 178
Here again are the familiar motifs-the "time and attention" test, the
notion that if activities do not have all the characteristics of certain
fixed and familiar types of business (here that of the typical real
estate dealer), they do not constitute business at all."' Here, too,
these ideas obscure the real question-why should the taxpayer be
prevented from offsetting its income from sales of lumber with losses
analogous to bad debts? Similarly, if the Lumber Company had
waited till market values rose and had disposed of the properties at a
profit, there would seem to be little reason why it should not have been
taxed just as much as if it had realized the profit upon the sale of lum-
ber. To attempt a compartmentalization of the taxpayer's activities
into several distinct and independent "businesses"-each of which must
exhibit a full set of the characteristics of business, such as "frequency,"
"continuity," and "extent" 18-is to do far more violence to economic
reality than must inhere in the statutory language "held . . . prima-
rily for sale to customers in . . . ordinary course .... 1P 1
177. Its holdings averaged thirty-six parcels at any one time.
178. 43 B.T.A, 726, 730.
179. The absurdity of the Thompson Lumber rationale was thrown into bold relief
by the case of Thompson Yards, Incorporated, P-H 1943 TC Mzax. DEc. 1 43,142 (1943),
wherein another and much larger lumber company was held to have realized mere
capital losses upon 45 -sales of real estate during 1937-9. These were but part of some
221 acquisitions and 183 sales made over a 15 year period. Ten eniployees "devoted
from 15 to 50 per cent of their time to real estate matters." Nevertheless the Tax Court
insisted that the corporation was not engaged in the real estate business, emphasizing the
fact that the time put in by the ten employees was but 1 per cent of the total spent in the
conduct of the corporation's affairs.
180. See note 127 supra.
181. To see how easily an opposite result could have been reached in the Thomiipson:
Lumber case, see Avery Brundage, P-H 1941 BTA ME . DEc. 1 41,508 (1941).
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This artificial distinction between a taxpayer's "real business" and
his "incidental" activities is repeatedly invoked, especially with re-
gard to financial institutions having restricted charter powers. For
example, a ruling of the Treasury's General Counsel provides that
banks acquiring real estate by mortgage foreclosure realize only cap-
ital gain or loss upon its subsequent disposition.112 Similarly, the sale
of bonds held as investments by insurance companies is treated as the
sale of capital assets.8 3
The enactment of Section 117(j) of the Internal Revenue Code has
to some extent widened the category of property "integral" as8 to the
tax-payer's business and correspondingly narrowed that of property
merely "incidental" 15 to it.' With regard to all property "used in
business," which is either real or depreciable property, 117(j) abandons
the requirement that it have been "held primarily for sale to customers
in the ordinary course" before loss realized upon its disposition can be
fully deducted as ordinary business loss. Thus in the case of the soft
drink manufacturer '1 who bought several hundred water coolers to
rent out (with a favorable option for purchase) so as to stimulate sales
of his beverage, deduction of anyloss realized by him upon a subsequent
resale of the water coolers would no longer be restricted as a capital
loss but could be taken in full as a loss upon the sale of depreciable
property used in business. However, if resale occurred after six
months "Is and resulted in a gain (i.e., the sale price exceeded the
depreciated cost basis of the water coolers), the question would arise
as to whether the asset should be classified as "held for sale" under
Section 117(a)(1) or "used in business" under Section 117(j).'- The
former would result in the entire gain being taxed at ordinary rates.
182. G.C.M. 24910, 1946 INr. Rrx. BULL No. 11 at 101 (1946), revoking G.C.M.
21497, 1939-2 Cus. Bum- 187. Cf. Kanavha Valley Bank, 4 T.C. 252 (1944).
183. It is significant that "in England gains or losses arising from such sales would
be taken into account for tax purposes [as ordinary income or ordinary losses] on the
theory that the buying and selling of securities is a necessary part of the insurance busi-
ness." Parker, supra note 45, at 605.
184. Avery Brundage, supra note 181.
185. Thompson Lumber Co., 43 B.T.A. 726 (1941).
186. However, it seems rather unlikely that the real estate acquired from insolvent
vendees by the Thompson Lumber Co. would be considered as "used in business" under
§ 117(j).
187. John Graf Co., 39 B.T.A. 379 (1939).
188. Under § 117(j), capital gain treatment is accorded only to assets held for more
than six months. As depreciable business property (like real estate used in business)
does not qualify for capital gain treatment under 1 1 7(a) (1), the sale of such property
prior to the expiration of the sb=-months period apparently gives rise to ordinary income.
189. A similar problem has arisen in connection with the classification of gain realized
upon the sale of animals held partly for breeding purposes. Albright v. United States,
173 F2d 339 (8th Cir. 1949), discussed in Hart & Embree, Sale of Breeding Livastoc:,
27 TA XEs 829 (1949). Cf. Boice & Hart, Selling Breedingq Stock Mcans Capital Gains,
23 TAxEs 350 (1945).
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The latter would lead to capital gains treatment. In this situation all
the familiar irrelevancies would come back into play. The taxpayer
would stoutly assert that the water coolers were not "property held
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or
business" because the ordinary course of his business is to sell soft
drinks, not water coolers; that the sale was casual, unrepeated, and
extraordinary; that the water coolers were held as "investments"
for their rentals and not as stock in trade for sale; that he is a merchant
whose customers are the consumers of beverages, not the purchasers
of the water coolers. The Commissioner would reply that the coolers
were not merely "used in business," but, like the taxpayers inventory
of soft drinks, were "held for sale to customers." He would emphasize
the favorable terms of the option to purchase given all lessees of the
water coolers and would argue that "primarily" the purpose of the
taxpayer was to induce the lessee to buy the water cooler once it was
in his possession and that thereby the taxpayer had embarked upon
a whole new and separate line of business; that there is nothing to
prevent a man from being in two businesses at once; that the water
cooler enterprise had sufficient continuity, regularity, etc., to con-
stitute a business; that even if the taxpayer gave it little personal
attention, a man can do business through agents. It is to such artificial
considerations that the law would look, rather than to the basic eco-
nomic question of whether the taxpayer's profit from the sale of the
water coolers would augment his economic well-being any less than an
equal sum realized from the sale of beverages." 0
Not only where gain is involved may Section 117(j) of the Internal
Revenue Code fail to eliminate fruitless controversy. Section 117(j)
does not even purport to touch upon the status of that entire class of
losses realized upon the sale of property used in business which is
neither real property nor depreciable property, i.e., stocks, bonds,
and similar intangible assets. Within this realm casuistry still holds
sway unlimited. A stock brokerage firm is found to have realized only
capital gain upon the sale of bank stocks held by it "to show an interest
in [those] particular banking institutions with which the firm was doing
business." 111 A corporation engaged, both as wholesaler and broker,
190. By permitting the full deductibility of loss upon sale of real property used in busi-
ness, INT. REv. CODE; § 117(j) also overrules cases such as Butler Consolidated Coal Co.,
6 T.C. 183 (1946), which held that a coal mine operator had realized a mere capital loss
upon the sale of coal in place. The mechanical reasoning of the Butler opinion is typical:
"The business of the petitioner was the mining and sale of coal-not the sale of coal
which it had purchased from others, but the sale of coal which it produced itself. Coal
in place is a part of the realty... .The petitioner was not engaged in the business of
selling real estate or 'coal in place.'" Id. at 189.
191. Wallace v. United States, 50 F. Supp. 178, 179 (W.D.N.Y. 1943), rCTd on
other grounds, 142 F2d 240 (2d Cir. 1944). The decision rests on the customary con-
struction of the statutory language: "[l]t does not seem that there was such a continuity
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in the business of selling coal to utilities, railroads, and retailers, is
held to have sustained no more than a capital loss upon the sale of
mining company stock acquired "for the primary purpose of maintain-
ing favorable relations" and of insuring its supply of coal. 192 In
neither case was the court moved by the fact that the "shares were
acquired as a necessary incident to the successful operation of its
business." 193
In sharp contrast to these cases is the line of decisions begun by
Gilbert v. Commissioner. " 4 As payment for their services as contractors
and engineers, Mr. Gilbert and his partner accepted, and reported as
income, 500 shares of the preferred stock of a company employing them
to erect an apartment house. The partners sold these shares at a loss
in 1926. The Board of Tax Appeals found that "[t]he partnership
did not receive the said shares of stock with any intention of holding
them. It accepted them in lieu of cash as a means of securing the con-
tract, with the intention of converting the shares of stock into cash as
soon as possible." 195 The Court of Appeals held that the loss was
fully deductible as an ordinary business loss.
The Gilbert decision was said to be "readily distinguishable" when
cited as a precedent in the case of The .Exposilion Souvenir Corpora-
tion. "I This company, in order to obtain its concession at the New York
World's Fair, had been obliged to bid and pay $130,000 for debentures
payable out of the Fair's gate receipts. When the Fair closed, the tax-
payer sold the debentures at a loss of $92,400. In holding that this
constituted no more than a capital loss, the court reasoned:
"Both in form and in substance this was an investment; a risky
one to be sure and motivated not by a desire to make capital gains
or to earn 4% interest but by the desire to acquire the concessions,
but none the less an investment since money was exchanged for
property, i.e., the debentures." 197
True, Mr. Gilbert received his interest in the apartment house by way
of compensation for his services as a contractor and did not pay cash
for it as did the World's Fair concessionaire for the debentures. It is
of purchases or that such time could have been expended in connection with these transac-
tions as brings such transactions within the meaning of stock held by the taxpayer pri-
marily for sale in the course of his trade," i.e., the brokerage firm was not also engaged
in a separate business as a "dealer" in bank stocks. Id. at 180.
192. Logan and Kanawha Coal Co., 5 T.C. 1298 (1945).
193. Id. at 1302.
194. 56 F2d 361 (1st Cir. 1932), reversing 21 B.T.A. 1245 (1931). Cf. Joe B. Fort-
son, 47 B.T.A. 158 (1942); Hercules Motors Corp., 40 B.T.A. 999 (1939). See also
Harry Dunitz, 7 T.C. 672 (1946).
195. Royce Gilbert, 21 B.T- 1245, 1246 (1934).
196. 163 F-2d 283 (2d Cir. 1947).
197. Id. at 286.
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also true that Mr. Gilbert contemplated an early resale of the stock at
the time he received it, whereas the souvenir company apparently did
not make a definite decision to dispose of its debentures until some time
after their acquisition. However, it has been said that "the intention
-of Congress . . . was to include in the comprehensive word 'held,'
property which might or might not have been purchased primarily
for the purpose of resale." I' Furthermore, the apparent differences
between the two cases are of less significance than the essential sim-
ilarities. In both cases the taxpayer had acquired securities, not as an
independent investment to be held for recurrent yield, but only as a
necessary step in obtaining a contract under which substantial profit-
making activities were carried on and ordinary taxable income was
generated. The souvenir company's loss resulted just as much from
this type of activity as did that of the building contractor. If the
"ordinary course" of the business of the Exposition Souvenir Corpor-
ation was the sale of souvenirs rather than the sale of debentures, it
is equally true that the "ordinary course" of Mr. Gilbert's "trade or
business was that of engineering and contracting, not the purchase and
sale of stock." "I Hence, it seems arbitrary to find that the debentures
were any more an "investment" than was the stock.
A sequel to this saga of Tweedledum and Tweedledee is found in the
Rockford Varnish Co. decision. 2°° In 1936 the taxpayer, a manufacturer
of varnish and shellac, accepted "secured trust deed notes" from two of
its regular customers, who had been in default in their open account
indebtedness since 1933. In 1943 the company sold these notes for
far less than their face value and claimed an ordinary business loss
under the Gilbert and two other decisions. The Tax Court, in denying
the full deduction, reasoned:
"the property came into the hands of the petitioner in the ordi-
nary course of its business and was not acquired to be held as an
investment. But in those cases there was a regular practice shown
of taking property in payment for products . . . and then selling
the property, while, here, the notes were taken long after the goods
had been sold, the notes were not sold for many years, and the
transactions in the notes were isolated rather than mere incidents
of a regularly used practice. It cannot fairly or properly be said
that they were held primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary
course of the petitioner's business." 201
198. Richards v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 369,373 (9th Cir. 1936).
199. Royce Gilbert, 21 B.T.A. 1245, 1247 (1934).
200. 9 T.C. 171 (1947).
,201. Id. at 172-3. The Tax Court concluded that "the sales resulted in capital losses
which did not reduce taxable income, since there were no capital gains against which to
offset the losses." Id. at 172. "This may be unfortunate, but it is in accordance with our
understanding of the law as enacted by Congress." Id. at 173. Cf. Graham Mill and
Elevator Co. v. Thomas, 152 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1945).
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Neither the Board of Tax Appeals nor the circuit court report of the
Gilbert case contains one shred of evidence indicating that Mr. Gilbert
had on any prior occasion received stock in payment for his construc-
tion work. It may be argued that such evidence was unnecessary under
Section 208 of the Revenue Act of 1926,"-12 which did not preface
"course of business" with the word "ordinary" or require that the an-
ticipated sale be "to customers." Yet the legislative history of these
1934 amendments shows a congressional purpose only to curtail the
loss deductions of professional stock market speculators, -2 3 not a pur-
pose to restrict losses resulting directly from the everyday operations
of a manufactiaring enterprise such as the Rockford Varnish Co. Hence
it seems that here is still another example of the utter absurdity of
denying to such a taxpayer-or to the World's Fair concessionaire-
the right to deduct the full amount of its loss on the ground that the
"isolated" sales of the notes-or debentures-were not "ordinary" or
"to customers."
G. What the Decisions Signify
The foregoing exposition of judicial decisions on the distinction be-
tween business and capital transactions is hardly complete. Only a
few of the hundreds of cases concerning the definition of the term
"capital asset" have been considered. Furthermore, a transaction will
not generate capital gain merely because it involves the disposition
of a "capital asset"; ordinary income will arise unless the disposition
is by way of a "sale or exchange." 204 Compared with the complexity
of the problems which have arisen in connection with the phrase "sale
or exchange," 205 the decisions interpreting the term "capital asset"
read like Tales from Mother Goose. Nevertheless the latter cases are
better suited as illustrations of the fundamental issues in capital gains
taxation. It is submitted that they afford a sufficient variety of speci-
mens from the jungle of tangled verbiage in this area of the law to
support some measure of generalization.
First, these decisions show that much futile quibbling is invited by
the words "property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to cus-
tomers in the ordinary course of his trade or business." "21 For each of
the supposedly fundamental principles enunciated by the courts in
attempting to apply this clause, a contrary quotation can usually be
found which vitiates its force. This tends to prevent the development
of a corpus of consistent doctrine available for the resolution of new
problems as they arise. Taxpayers, therefore, enjoy much less predic-
202. 44 STAT. 19 (1926).
203. See discussion in Section I supra.
204. INT. REv. Coun § 117(a) (2), (3), (4), and (5).
205. See Section V infra.
206. INT. REv. CoDE§ 117(a) (1).
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tability as to tax consequences than they deserve, at least in com-
mercial transactions.
More important is the fact that taxpayers are often denied their
right to be taxed no more severely than others in substantially similar
circumstances. The cases demonstrate that very many of the lines
drawn by the law are arbitrary and often operate unfairly. Fur-
thermore, it should especially be observed how often it is not the tax
collector but the taxpayer who gets bogged down in the doctrinal
morass. This suggests that the benefits enjoyed by one segment of the
public from the favorable treatment of capital gains are, because of the
corresponding limitations on the deduction of capital lQsses, obtained
at the cost of severe hardship to other less fortunate persons.
What is most significant about the foregoing decisions, however, is
that they indicate that the law does not achieve with reasonable ac-
curacy the end to which it is supposedly directed-the isolation and
special treatment of gain arising in "investment" transactions. This
failure is easily understood. The word "investment" refers to no
readily ascertainable economic phenomenon. When scrutinized closely
"investment" becomes indistinguishable from other kinds of activity
whereby income is obtained by virtue of the ownership of property.
Nor do the shifting connotations of "business" and "speculation," the
two abstractions contrasted with "investment," afford more stable
criteria. As employed in the decisions, all three of these words have
little economic substance and still less relevance to the problem of
achieving equity in taxation. It is because these underlying concepts
purport to differentiate transactions which are far more alike than
they are dissimilar 20 that a contrary decision could so easily have been
made in many of the cases. The result is that "there is no clear separa-
tion, in practice, between capital gains and ordinary income." 20
V. THE "SALE OR EXCHANGE" CONCEPT-How IT INTERACTS WIT11
THE "CAPITAL ASSET" CONCEPT
The foregoing conclusion-that in operation the distinction between
capital gains and ordinary income proves unsatisfactory-can easily be
reinforced by an examination of the "sale or exchange" concept. This
concept does not come into play unless the subject matter of the trans-
action qualifies as a "capital asset." Otherwise ordinary income rather
than capital gain will result, even if a "sale or exchange" has occurred.
207. 'Thile capital gains have some unique features, in the main there is more
similarity than difference between the income from the sale of real estate and capital
assets on the one hand, and the more ordinary sale of groceries and furniture, for in-
stance, on the other." Professor GRovrs in CAPiTAL GAINs TAXATIoN 17 (Tax Institute
Symposium, 1946).
208. Report of Subcommittee, Hearings before Committee on Ways and Means on Pro-
posed Tax Revision, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 9,38 (1938).
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However, once the subject matter of the transaction has been char-
acterized as a "capital asset," its disposition must constitute a "sale
or exchange" to qualify for capital gain treatment. Because many
transactions involving "capital assets" do not also involve a "sale orex-
change," this latter requirement offers a means for effecting a substan-
tial curtailment of the anomalies inherent in the capital gain provisions.
However, a mere enumeration of some notorious problems which have
arisen in connection with the "sale or exchange" concept will serve to
indicate that this additional requirement has itself become the source
of still further anomalies.
A. Sales
If the owner of unimproved real property "leases" it for 99 years, the
rent from the "lessee" is ordinary income taxable at progressive rates.-
If he "sells" it in consideration of the "purchaser's" promise to make
non-interest-bearing installment payments, he is entitled to receive
the equivalent of his cost basis tax-free, the balance constituting mere
capital gain. In either case he receives a series of cash payments in
lieu of his, and later his children's, right to immediate possession, a
right which ordinarily represents the major portion of the current
market value of the property. The question whether a "sale" or a
"lease" has been made is, of course, relevant to the measure of his eco-
nomic benefit insofar as it concerns the right of his heirs to repossess
the land at the expiration of the 99 years. However, in a free market
it may be assumed that the "purchase price" would exceed the sum of
the 99 year "rentals" by approximately the value of the reversion. 10
Hence it is hard to see why the two types of transaction require different
tax treatment.
This disparity in tax consequences is intensified where the subject
matter of the transaction is not land but property having a relatively
short useful life. "Royalties" paid by a "licensee" for the use of
patents or copyrights are subject to surtax when received by the "li-
censor." 211 However, by the simple expedient of phrasing the contract
in "sale" rather than "license" terminology-and apparently with no
substantial loss of protection for the party disposing of the intangible
-2 12
-the capital gains provisions can be made to apply. -13 Here too the
209. IxT. RiV. CoDE §22(a). Rental income from improved property is, of course,
partially offset by depreciation deductions. INT. REV. CODE § 23(1) (2).
210. Even though the landowner were to receive no more for an outright sale than
under a long-term lease, under present law he might prefer the former alternative if the
resultant tax-saving exceeded the value of the reversion.
211. INT. REv. CoDE § 22 (a).
212. Cf. Commissioner v. Celanese Corporation, 140 F.2d 339 (D.C. Cir. 1944) and
related cases involving "conditions subsequent."
213. Fincke, An Analysis of the Income Aspectr of Patlts, Copyrights, and Their
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law fails to inquire whether the resultant income represents an in-
crease in the recipient's ability to pay equal to that represented by an
equal amount of income from other sources. It has yet to be demon-
strated that a profit realized upon the sale of a patent or copyright does
not benefit the seller as much as a royalty of like amount. In the ab-
sence of such proof, there seems little basis for the view that fairness
requires that income received upon a "sale or exchange" of the re-
cipient's entire "bundle of rights" should be taxed differently 214 than
income received in consideration of a "license" of less than all of his
rights.
Nor is it clear that this is necessary in the interests of an efficiently
functioning economy. National policy does not seem to require the
encouragement of certain transactions merely because they take the
form of a "sale" rather than a "license." It is equally doubtful that
socially useful transfers of intangibles of this sort would be impeded
unless there were some way in which they could be effected without
subjecting the transferor to ordinary surtax rates. Even if it be as-
sumed that this argument is valid for certain types of property, "I
it would seem inapplicable to patents and copyrights. Unless the
owner of a patent or copyright utilizes it in a business of his own, lie
cannot derive any income from it until he disposes of some or all of his
rights in it. In this respect his position is factually unlike that of the
owner of corporate stock or improved real estate who enjoys the al-
ternative of a recurrent yield if he chooses not to sell. Hence there
seems little merit in the argument that the holders of patents and copy-
rights would refuse to permit exploitation of their property if there
were no way to avoid surtax rates upon the resultant income.
The patent and copyright field affords but one illustration of the
many anomalous situations created by special treatment of "sales."
Such anomalies are undesirable, not only in themselves, but also be-
cause they generate prolific litigation as to whether particular transac-
tions are to be classified as "sales." 218 Detailed analysis of this litiga-
tion lies beyond the scope of a discussion primarily concerned with the
"capital asset" concept. 217 For present purposes it must suffice to
Analogues, 5 TAx L. REV. 361 (1950); Fulda, Copyright Assignments and the Capital
Gains Tax, 58 YALE L.J. 245 (1949); Geller & Levitan, A Study of Tax Problems Re-
lating to Patents, 25 TAxEs 313 (1947); Greenlee & Kramer, Capital Gains on Sales of
Patents, 26 TAXES 779 (1948) ; Schulman, The Artist and His Tax Burden, 27 TAxES 101
(1949) ; Scwartz, Authors and the Federal Income Tax, 26 TAXEs 51 (1948).
214. See Fulda, Copyright Assigninets and the Capital Gains Tax, 58 YAL L.). 245
(1949).
215. See discussion in Section VI infra.
216. This problem too is well illustrated by the cases involving patents and copyrights,
collected in the articles cited in note 213 supra.
217. In a. Note, Sale or Exchange of .Capital Assets: Scope and Treatment for Tax
Purposes, 27 VA. L. Rxv. 795, 806 (1941), appears a brief discussion of "the broadening
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state that the vexatious problem of what is a "sale" has arisen in many
factual contexts, including the disposal of partnership interests, 28
trust interests,2 19 oil and gas interests, 2- covenants not to compete,22
leases,22 2 evidences of indebtedness, -2 23 and even radio shows.22 4 It is
believed that a systematic study of these cases would demonstrate
that the "sale" concept is just as inappropriate for tax purposes as is the
"capital asset" concept and that there are numerous instances in which
ordinary income has been transformed into capital gain-for no better
reason than that it was received under circumstances which could be
characterized as a "sale," as that term has been developed in other
branches of the law for purposes having little to do with taxation.
B. Exchanges
The various anomalies which stem from the "sale" concept indicate
that it is not "only through corporations that special treatment of
capital gains opens the way to easy, systematic avoidance of personal
income tax on a large scale." 225 Nevertheless there can be little doubt
of the meaning of 'sale and exchange' both by legislative enactment and by judicial in-
terpretation to include: retirement of corporate bonds, whether through pre-arranged
agreement or compulsory surrender; redemption of stock; loss of property by mortgagor
under foreclosure (the courts here sweeping away the distinction between voluntary and
involuntary sale) ; losses from failure to exercise stock rights; and losses on worthless
stocks or bonds." Cf. 3 MIuNRTmEs, LAW OF FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION § 22.17 (1942).
218. Bull v. United States, 295 U.S. 247 (1935) ; Allen S. Lehman, 7 T.C. 1038 (1946),
aff'd, 165 F.2d 383 (2d Cir. 1948) ; Rabkin & Johnson, The Partnership under the Federal
Tax Laws, 55 HAnv. L. REv. 909 (1942); Scott, Capital Gain on Sale of Partnership In-
terest, 41 M Ic. L. Rxv. 739 (1943) ; Brookes, The Strange Arature of the Partnership Un-
der the Income Tax Law, 5 TAx L. Rzv. 35, 45 (1949).
219. McAllister v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denicd, 330 U.S.
826 (1947) ; Note, Taxability of Proceeds on Sale of a Right to Income for Life, 56
YALE L.J. 570 (1947).
220. Note, Taxation of Net Profit Interests in Oil Properties, 56 r., LJ. 170
(1946); Miller, Selling "Oil Payment," 27 TAXES 185 (1949); Rabldn & Johnson, The
Income Tax upon Oil and Gas Interests, 90 U. OF PA. L. REv. 383 (1942).
221. Rainier Brewing Co., 7 T.C. 162 (1946), aff'd, 165 F2d 217 (9th Cir. 1943);
Seattle Brewing and Malting Co., 6 T.C. 856 (1946), aff'd, 165 F2d 216 (9th Cir. 1948) ;
Ellen J. Franklin, 6 T.C.M. 1099 (1947); Kamens & Ancier, Tax Consequences of a
Covenant Not to Compete, 27 TAXES 8S91 (1949).
222. Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1941).
223. Hale v. Helvering, 85 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1936). Bingham v. Commissioner, 105
F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1939) and cases involving mortgages are discussed in Lovanles, The
Taxation of Capital Gains and Losses Under the Federal Income Tax, 26 TmcAs I- Rnv.
440, 451-4 (1948); Brown, Outline of Mortgagee's Tax Liability, 25 TAxES 1035 (1947).
See also INT. REv. CODE § 117(f) and Commissioner v. Caulkins, 144 F.2d 482 (6th
Cir. 1944), discussed in Mandell, Using Section 117(f) to Convert Ordinary Income (In-
terest) into Capital Gain, PROCEEDINGS or THE NEW YORK Uvumsrr, SETH.Tn AnzzUAL
INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL TAXATION, 405-17 (1949).
224. Altman, Tax Effects of the Sale of a tRadio Show, 27 TA.XEs 19 (1949) ; Mintz,
Entertainers and the Capital Gains Tax, 4 TAx L. REv. 275 (1949).
225. SI O s, supra note 154, at 158.
1950]
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
that the "sale or exchange" component of the capital gain provisions,
and especially its "exchange" element, takes on its greatest practical
importance in connection with transactions involving corporate secur-
ities. This is, of course, attributable to the fact that securities are
certain to qualify as "capital assets" unless held by a "dealer." 220
It is common knowledge that the problem presented in securities
transactions stems from the taxation of capital gains at rates lower
than those applicable to ordinary distributions of corporate earnings.
This discrepancy makes it possible for a stockholder who makes a
"sale or exchange" of all, or a part, of his stock to enjoy the benefit of
an increase in corporate net worth at capital gains rates,2 12 despite the
fact that those earnings would be subject to surtax if received as a
dividend.
22 1
Although logically and historically it is the root of the problem,22
the fundamental disparity in tax consequences found in this common-
place occurrence does not, in itself, account for all of the opportunities
for "systematic avoidance . . . on a large scale." These opportunities
result not so much from this simple phenomenon as they do from collat-
eral rules which supposedly are necessary corollaries to the capital gains
provisions in Section 117 of the Code. Thus Section 115(c) provides
that the distribution of all of a corporation's assets to its shareholders
and the surrender of all of the stock to the corporation shall be re-
garded as an "exchange," 230 so that capital gains rates apply to any
part of the distribution which may be in excess of the amount of the
shareholder's investment. Apparently consistency is thought to re-
quire that if a gain realized upon the sale of stock is to receive special
treatment, so must a gain realized upon the surrender of stock when the
corporation is liquidated.3 1 Otherwise the size of the tax would depend
upon a circumstance having little relevance to the change in the stock-
holder's economic position, i.e., whether the consideration for the stock
was furnished by a third party purchaser or by the issuing corpora-
226. Cf. the criteria set forth in the Van Suetendael opinion, 3 T.C.M. 987 (1944), dis-
cussed in Section II s.upra.
227. Note, Dizidend-Onz Purchases, 14 U. oF Cnr. L. REV. 281 (1947).
228. This tax saving may be partially offset if the purchase price of the stock is re-
duced to reflect the tax which the purchaser will have to pay when the earnings are
eventually distributed. This later tax may be considerable where the business activities
of the corporation are to continue unabated.
229. Comment, Stockholder Realization of Corporate Earnings and the Income Tax,
17 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 338 (1950).
230. INT. REv. Cons § 115(c) begins: "Amounts distributed in complete liquildation
of a corporation shall be treated as in full payment in exchange for the stock. .. ."
231. Another argument in support of capital gains treatment of corporate liquidations
is that fairness requires some mitigation of the impact of progressive tax rates upon
the receipt, within a single year, of corporate profits accumulated over many years, Darrell,
Corporate Liquidations and the Federal Income Tax, 89 U. OF PA. L. REv. 907, 931 (1941).
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tion. By thus placing complete liquidations on a parity with sales,
Section 115(c) substantially simplifies the task of stockholders who
seek to cash in on corporate earnings at capital gains rates.2 32 It elim-
inates the necessity of finding a purchaser willing to pay a sufficiently
high price for the stock.
However, if consistency requires that distributions in complete
liquidation are to be taxed like sales at capital gains rates, it also re-
quires similar treatment of distributions in partial liquidation, i.e.,
liquidations in which part of the corporate assets are distributed in
exchange for part of the stock.233 Otherwise, the amount of the tax
would depend upon whether, after the retirement of the particular
stock held by the taxpayer, the corporation continued in business or
wound up its affairs.2 34 Accordingly the statute 235 now provides that
distributions in partial liquidation can also give rise to long-term cap-
ital gains, 236 provided, however, that if the distribution is found to be
"essentially equivalent" to an ordinary dividend, progressive rates
will apply. 21
Because capital gains treatment is available to at least some dis-
tributions in partial liquidation, it is possible for a stockholder to avoid
the payment of surtax rates upon a distribution of corporate earnings
made long before business considerations permit a complete liquidation
of the corporation. What is even more important, a shareholder who
owns stock of more than one class may be able to enjoy the benefit of
capital gains treatment without major impairment of his right to share
in future profits 23 -an advantage which is not possible with complete
232. E.g., the use, especially in the motion picture industry, of the "collapsible corpora-
tion" organized in anticipation of liquidation. For incisive and competent discussion see
Bittker & Redlich, Corporate Liquidations and the Income Tax, 5 TAx L. REv. 437 (1950).
233. The term "partial liquidation" is defined in Ixr. REv. CoDE § 115(i).
234. However, during the period when distributions in partial liquidation were taxed
at progressive rates, the holder of the shares to be redeemed could obtain capital gain
treatment by selling them to a friend who would then surrender them to the corporation.
Stanley D. Beard, 4 T.C. 756 (1945) ; NV. P. Hobby, 2 T.C. 980 (1943).
235. INT. REV. CODE § 115(c), as amended by Revenue Act of 1942, § 147, 56 STAT.
841 (1942). Cf. Murphy, Partial Liquidations and the Arew Look, 5 TAx L. REv. 73, 74
(1949); Bittker & Redlich, Corporate Liquidations and The Income Tax, 5 TAX L. REv.
437 (1950).
236. Cf. Joseph IV. Imler, 11 T.C. 836 (1948); Samuel A. Uphamn, 4 T.C. 1120 (1945).
237. INT. REv. CODE § 115(g). KIrschenbaum v. Commissioner, 155 F2d 23 (2d Cir.
1946) ; Flanagan v. Helvering, 116 F2d 937 (D.C. Cir. 1940) and related cases discussed in
Danzig, Distributions in Liquidations and Reorganimtiotu-Their Ta Consequcwes, 26
TAXES 645 (1948); Miller, Stock Redemptions, at 455. PROCEEDnis oF Timl ,,, "Yon-
UxrvERsrry SixTH AlxuAL. INsTrruTE oN FErMuA. TmxoxoN 307 (1948) ; Gutlin & Bed,
Stock Redemptions as Taxable Events Under Section 115(g), 24 TAXEs 1172 (1946) ;
Crown, Essentially Equivalent to the Distribuf ion of a Taxable Dividend, 25 TAx=s 146
(1947) ; Bittker & Redlich, supra note 232, at 455.
238. Despite the caveat in U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, §29.115-9 that a distribution in par-
tial liquidation will generally be considered as "essentially equivalent to the distribution
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liquidations. This advantage can be enjoyed, however, only in cases
where some -of the outstanding stock may conveniently be retired.
Where no such stock is already outstanding, it is first necessary for
the corporation to get this extra stock into the hands of the sharehold-
ers. If this can be done without levy of a tax upon the receipt of new
stock, 239 then it might later be feasible for the corporation to reacquire
stock in "exchange" for a distribution of earnings.
240
Although the foregoing sketch is hardly adequate to the manifold
intricacies of the law relating to corporate readjustments, 14 1 it does
serve to indicate that the full significance of the capital gains provisions
cannot be appreciated merely by considering how they affect the "typ-
ical investor" who owns ten shares of United States Steel. To appraise
these provisions properly it is necessary to view them, not in artificial
isolation, but as they operate in conjunction with other rules, espe-
cially those which assist the owners of closely-held corporations in their
attempts to receive the benefit of corporate profits in a form which will
be taxed as capital gain. When so viewed, it will be observed that
special treatment of capital gains lends itself to, and indeed invites,
extensive manipulation of corporate structures solely to avoid taxes.242
This end is very different from those, to be discussed in Section VI
below, which supposedly justify the capital gains provisions.
An argument can be advanced that the various opportunities for
tax avoidance latent in the "sale or exchange" concept indicate the
abuse rather than the use of the capital gains provisions. This implies
that such phenomena are no more than extraneous and infrequent by-
products which could be eliminated without alteration in the under-
lying concepts of Section 117.24 Such reasoning, however, diverts
of a taxable dividend" where unaccompanied by a shift in the proportionate interests of
the stockholders, such distributions have nevertheless been taxed at capital gain rates.
See the cases collected in Danzig, Distributions in Liquidations and Reorganuiaions-
Their Tax Consequences, 26 TAxEs 645, 649 (1948).
239. . Darrell, Recent Developments in Nontaxable Reorganizations and Stock Dividends,
61 HAv. L. Rxv. 958 (1948); DeWind, Preferred Stock "Bai-Outs" and the Income
Tax, 62 HARv. L. REv. 1126 (1949).
240. Retirement of the new shares after acquisition by a bona fide purchaser or retire-
ment of the old shares rather than the new, might help to prevent frustration of the scheme
by the operation of INT. REV. CoDE § 115(g). See note 237 supra. A sale of either the
old or the new stock would not be affected by 115(g), although it may some day be
affected by a new Treasury policy. See note 239 supra. Because of the additional
shares, such a sale might, like a stock redemption, enable a stockholder to cash in on
undistributed surplus at capital gain rates without major sacrifice of his stake in the
corporation's future.
241. For a more comprehensive analysis, see Comment, Stockholder Realzathon of
Corporate Earnings and the Income Tax, 17 U. oF Cux. L. REv. 338 (1950).
242. Ibid.
243. This argument overlooks the anomalies which stem from the everyday use of the
capital gain provisions, e.g., the fact that, while depreciation deductions reduce fully-tax-
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attention from the enduring sources of the problem and towards what-
ever may happen to be its current symptoms. The practical con-
sequences of this point of view is an apparently interminable succession
of piecemeal palliatives.
Without denying all value to the slow process of plugging loopholes
as they appear, it is submitted that, like the labors of Sisyphus, this
task is likely to be endless, unless there occurs a more general appre-
ciation of some of the basic aspects of the problem. There is need for a
recognition that simpl! terms such as "business," "capital asset,"
"sale," and "exchange" do not refer to simple economic facts but to
subtle legal categories which, though perhaps useful in some areas of
the law, have little relevance for taxation. To employ such concepts
to discriminate among the infinite variations and gradations of in-
come-producing transactions is therefore, of necesssity, a futile en-
deavor. Nevertheless these alien distinctions have been made to serve
as a dike creating an artificial haven from the buffeting of surtaxes.
Therefore it is only natural that the difference between the levels of
taxation on the two sides of this dike should cause leakage into the
low pressure area. It is also natural that this leakage should have in-
creased during the past decade as the pressure differential was inten-
sified by higher surtaxes and lower capital gains rates. So long as this
differential exists the most diligent efforts to plug each new crack in
the wall may be inadequate to prevent substantial loss of revenue.
It is submitted that this brief discussion of the "sale or exchange"
criterion serves to emphasize the conclusion drawn from the more
detailed analysis of the "capital asset" concept-that in practical
application the distinction between capital gains and ordinary income
has been highly unsatisfactory. The difficulties encountered have been
so numerous and important that it is necessary to inquire why the law
attempts to make such a distinction. Why should capital gains be
singled out for favored tax treatment? This question will be considered
in Part II in the light of the various theories advanced to justify the
capital gains provisions.
able ordinary business income, the accompanying reduction in cost basis increases a mere
capital gain upon the subsequent sale of the asset. Still another such anomaly is found
in the case of the "dividend-on' purchaser. See Note, Dkidcnd-On Purchases, 14 U. oF
CHL L. REv. 281 (1947).
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